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INTRODUCTION 
 Communication about counterterror policy resides in an interesting political space.  This study seeks to make clear that labeling a group or individual as a terrorist is a policy choice in its own right.  The prominence of counterterrorism in foreign policy feeds interest in labeling certain groups, individuals and actions as terrorist and the characteristics of those labeled shape policy concerns.  Decision-makers can affect how policy is conceptualized through the labeling process.  The fuzziness in the definition of terrorism used by states allows a means for leaders to affect how the term is used.  In this Introduction, I will discuss why we should view the terrorist labeling process as part of a larger policy process, as well as the theoretical underpinnings that point to the language of terrorism as an important mechanism for understanding counterterror actions.  Then, I will discuss the specific structure of the United States’ Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, which will be the primary focus of this study.  Finally, I will outline the work of the rest of this dissertation.   
Defining Terrorism Is Part of the Policy Process There have been difficulties coming to a common definition of terrorism in discourse since its reappearance as a major foreign policy issue in the late 1960s. 
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Currently, there are a plethora of definitions related to terrorism, from legal definitions in the US code, to international agreements, to understandings that derive from everyday use.  In this paper, I argue that the idea of terrorism in the United States is created through a definitional bargaining process that takes place in the decision-making process of making the terrorist watch list.  The definition constructed by elites is then picked up and contextualized in interactions between leaders and the public, and media reports about counterterror efforts and group activities.  Even if the definition of terrorism seems more fixed in policy and state circles than it used to be, the assertion that the definition is not established still motivates a lot of research, suggesting that any definition has not reached the level of wholesale acceptance.  Importantly, the general outlines of any definition of terrorism are so broad that many more violent groups could be labeled as terrorists than are.  The lack of any universally applicable definition of terrorism opens up policy space both domestically and internationally in which controlling the discourse surrounding terrorism can have policy consequences.   We know that the public will demand action to prevent terrorism, and that this demand can lead to an oversupply of publicly visible counterterror policy (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007).  Still, with so little actually available to the public about how states enact their counterterror goals (and what those goals are) and what results, citizens are left at a disadvantage when seeking to engage with their leaders about counterterrorism.   Since so much of how states work to ensure safety is hidden, government leaders and citizens are left with a smaller number of issues to bargain over when the public is dissatisfied with how counterterror impacts their 
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lives.  Leaders can only say so much about what the government is doing in this sensitive area, and the public can only respond to what they know.   In a country like the United States, the stakes are high for leaders who may face electoral costs if their constituencies are too unhappy.  Changes in leadership may also affect how government agencies and bureaucracies are run, thus affecting even unobservable counterterror policy over the long term.   In addition, counterterror as a foreign policy initiative will often require buy-in from other states.  In order to effectively fight against a terror threat, a state will need to run operations abroad, and get those states to agree that fighting terrorism is the right thing to do.  Leaders within states then must agree on what constitutes a terrorist group and what are appropriate countermeasures to those groups.   Putnam (1988) conceptualizes international politics as a two-level game in which domestic groups and politicians pressure the government for favorable policy outcomes and international leaders seek to maximize their ability to satisfy domestic publics.  The best decisions when interacting with other leaders over foreign policy may not match the preferred domestic outcome.  Choosing to label terrorist groups or not places decision-makers in a position in which they may seek to appease domestic constituencies, and maintain decision-making power, but must also look at how to best enact effective counterterror policy abroad.  Uncertainty about domestic processes often has effects on international negotiations and can affect bargaining outcomes between states (Putnam, 1988).  I argue that listing terrorist groups requires leaders to take both domestic and international political concerns into account in a way that mirrors Putnam’s more formalized bargaining 
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environment.  State leaders may debate which groups they desire to have on terrorist watch lists as part of broader counterterror initiatives, but the labeling decisions will have outsize impact on domestic public perceptions because those decisions are the ones that are visible to citizens.   Following this logic, defining meaning has implications for policy choices that states will make.  By defining some groups as terrorists and some actions as appropriate given that designation, states get to shape international behavior in this issue area.  Wendt (1992) claims that enemies are defined intersubjectively so an actor should want to push for their definition of terrorism and terrorist to become dominant because it will organize what actions against terrorism are allowed by the system.  Watch lists also possibly create “bright lines” beyond which some level of violence is unacceptable (Schelling, 1966).  Listing can create audience costs that make the possibility of future action by the listing state against a group more credible.   It makes sense that leaders would want to use the widely known presence of the watch lists to communicate with their public and international audiences.  For public officials such as congressmen, foreign policy experts, and bureaucrats, the watch lists can be a way to engage with the public in defining counterterror policy.  The lists can inform the public about what makes a terrorist threat to the country and which groups are threats.  The lists can act as a consensus builder between states to define what groups are concerns across nations.  Listing can be used as a policy tool to affect public opinion about groups and interests.  The absence or removal of groups and individuals also gives information about the nature of 
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security threats against the country.  Moreover, the public can engage with the idea of terrorist watch lists to create a discourse about terrorism and counterterrorism with elites.     Schmid (1992) has previously divided discussions of terrorism into areas of discourse, suggesting that the idea of terrorism reaches different critical space in academic, state, public, and opposition conversation.  Academic consensus over the definition of terrorism focuses on it being a tactic using force or violence for political purposes and publicity.  Other seemingly important aspects of terrorism are not as often incorporated in the academic conceptualization.  The coercive, fear-inducing nature of the action and its place as an extra-legal means of policy promotion are more or less absent from academic discourse (Weinberg, et al., 2004).  This discrepancy suggests that there is a gap between the approach taken by studies of terror and counterterror activity and the general discourse.    Acknowledging a lack of firm definition is the first step in this research program that examines how discourse around terrorism affects how groups are treated.  According to Laffey and Weddes (1997) and Milliken (1999), discourse is a system of signification that constructs social realities that are shaped by actors’ interests and ideas.  Discourse defines how actors interact with the world, sometimes conferring legitimacy on certain actors and actions over others.  However, discourse is not set and can be changed over time so tracing the creation of current social realities is a meaningful academic task to help explain differences in behavior.  Milliken argues that looking at discursive strategies to explain real-
 6 
world outcomes is a first step for understanding how policy outcomes are based in linguistic choices.    Definitional decisions are especially important in terrorism discourse because the term terrorist has such negative connotations that any actor associated with that term is likely to experience consequences.  Stump (2009) suggests that examinations of terrorism discourse are hindered by the fact that the starting point for discussion is often at the existence of terrorist actors, rather than at the idea of terrorism as a social construct.  Stump counters that terrorism studies should instead start by investigating the process of meaning-making that creates a space for terrorism in the discourse.  Labeling can function as a means to “negate legitimacy” of certain actors, actions, and outcomes.  Being considered a terrorist both characterizes those actors as using illegitimate means to affect political outcomes and also treats those caught up in the label as “the other.”  Terrorism in America is not just a tactic but also an extra-legal choice that means that those who perpetrate it are outside societal norms.  Terrorism is such an extreme label that policymakers can define the world in terms of terrorists and those who fight them (Altheide, 2007).    Weinberg and colleagues note that the term terrorism has become so loaded that definitional differences are difficult to resolve (Weinberg et al., 2004).  They observe that there are a number of issues with how terrorism has been conceptualized.  For instance, the authors point out that the line between terror and other forms of political violence has been blurred by the continued broad use of the term.  The negative connotations of terrorism means that those labeled are 
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implicated in a set of motivations that may or may not be true.  The authors also find that the label is more likely to be applied to actions taking place in close physical or psychological proximity to the labeler.  Terrorism is also being applied to a whole range of activities – such as narco-terrorism or cyber-terrorism – that may not involve the use of violence that seems central to the term.    Chang and Mehan (2006) state that political discourse in democracies inevitably involves competition over the power to set meaning.  Single meanings of objects prevail through continued use in the discourse.   Setting meanings helps solidify legitimacy of actors and consolidates power over policy choices.  The discourse surrounding the idea of terrorism is still playing out, meaning there are still stakes in setting the definition.  In fact, it may be that keeping the definition of terrorism in a subjective state is useful to designators as it allows more flexibility to shape the term to interests in the moment.  An objective definition would come at the expense of the flexibility afforded by the term’s ambiguity (Bhatia, 2009).   Hülsse and Spencer (2008) argue that terrorism should first be looked at as a product of discourse surrounding the idea, rather than as a set of actions.  How terrorism is framed shapes responses to violent phenomena.  Changes in conceptions of the term terrorism affect how policies are implemented and where public opinion places counterterror efforts on a spectrum of military to criminal response.  Shared meanings coming from discourse imply the ability for reciprocal communication between the public and elites.  The media plays an important role by presenting definitional options to the public in the course of shaping common understandings (Chang and Mehan, 2006).   
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Understanding the dynamics behind definitional choices and how they affect outcomes is important for interpreting the actions states take in regard to counterterrorism.  Yee (1996) emphasizes an interpretation of econometric results rests on having a valid casual theory.  Non-statistical methods such as process tracing and discourse analysis need to be done as a first step to understanding policy outcomes that rest on understandings of certain terms.  According to Yee, many works in international relations assume the impact of ideas on policies rather than explaining the how their impact mediates policy.  Ideas that arise out of discourse can affect how actors interact with the world by constraining possible actions, supplying meaning and creating intersubjective understandings that make some choices more likely than others.  The terrorist list-making process is an example of a situation in international politics in which future results rely on an understanding of the discourse.  Elites and the public must bargain over the meaning of the term ‘terrorism’ to come to an understanding of the impact and efficacy of counterterror policy choices.  This dissertation is an exploration of the bargaining process over conceptions of terrorism and its impact on overall understandings of counterterror actions in the United States.    
A Brief History of US Terrorist Watch Lists 
 The United States has kept some version of a terror group watch list since 1976.  The Central Intelligence Agency released the Patterns of International 
Terrorism guidelines under the purview of the National Foreign Assessment Center until 1980.  The Department of State maintained the watch list from 1981 onward, 
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first under report Patterns of Global Terrorism.  Following directives in the United States Code1 the Department of State began releasing terrorist group watch lists with the annual Country Reports on Terrorism in 2004.  The initial report in 1976 contained a foldout appendix of noteworthy groups that mark the basis of this study.  However, the reports dropped a formal list in 1977 and did not begin including formal lists again until 1986.   From that point onward all reports included a list of designated foreign terrorist organizations, along with known aliases and other background information.   The State Department began keeping the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in 1997.  Unlike previous versions of the FTO list, found in the Department’s 
Patterns of Global Terrorism yearly review, the new version of the list added mandatory legal consequences to being listed.  These consequences are codified under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  The legal ramifications for listing have added another layer to the interagency process of designation.  Because groups have the right to challenge listing in court, an administrative record of decisions must be kept, usually relying heavily on classified information sources.   According to a 2015 recent GAO review, the State Department goes through a six-stage process of designation.  First, the State Department conducts an equity check in which the Counterterrorism (CT) Bureau consults both other government agencies and other bureaus within State to confirm that no conflicts exist to stop listing.  Second, the CT Bureau creates an administrative record.  The administrative                                                         1 22 U.S.C § 2656f 
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record reports the legal basis for listing a certain group, taking evidence from all available sources.  Third, the CT Bureau clears the listing decision with the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury.  These two departments are the primary sources of prosecution of members of listed groups.  Fourth, the Secretary of State approves the designation.  Fifth, Congress is notified of the decision.  Finally a notice is filed with the Federal Register.   Input from other agencies is an important part of the first three stages of the decision making process.  The administrative records of recent designations have taken input from a number of other agencies.  Through this record, the FTO list allows for the process of “actionable intelligence” gathering.  The listing process itself involves collecting information and understanding a group’s activities through a legal lens.  That actionable intelligence can be used in later prosecutions of individuals whose actions are tied to the formally listed group (Brienholt, 2014).  The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other intelligence agencies have contributed to the record.  The GAO also runs a document review of the record before final listing decisions are made (GAO, 2015).   This record is available to agents in a number of departments, including State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury who may need it in determining legal courses in regard to both groups and affiliated individuals (Cronin, 2003).  Since the passage of ADEPA, the State Department has reissued the list yearly, with reviews and re-designations occurring five years after the initial designation of a given group.  Nine groups have been removed from the list through this re-
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designation process.  No group has ever successfully challenged a designation in court.  Designation of groups has seen a steady upward trend from the 20 groups initially listed in 1997 to 59 groups listed today.    A number of advantages to the FTO list have been noted.  The list provides legal clarity to the counterterror efforts.  Leaders can claim that the list makes the US safer by providing clear channels for cutting terrorist funding and removing operatives from the United States.  The list has advantages in interactions with other states.  Adding groups that allies care about provides a “point of convergence” in negotiations and can therefore be used as a diplomatic tool through the Department of State.  The FTO list also broadcasts US policy about these groups to other states, and stigmatizes both the groups and potential supporters of the group by opening them up to prosecution (Cronin, 2003).  The list is a way for the state to continually emphasize the importance of counterterrorism for US foreign policy.    There are a number of consequences to groups that end up on the FTO list for the group in question as well as for individuals that may have a connection to the group.  Groups listed are subject to asset freezing and asset seizure.  Group members are subject to asset freezing and may possibly be prosecuted under the material support clause of the US code (18 U.S.C. § 2339).  The material support clause is an example of strategic over-inclusiveness.  The clause allows prosecutors to criminalize activities that surround a terrorist event but are not necessarily dangerous on their own (Brienholt, 2011).  The FTO list strengthens prosecutors’ cases that rely on the material support clause by demarcating a set of potential 
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defendants while leaving the scope of activities that fall under the law open (Brienholt, 2011).   The Department of Homeland Security and Citizenship and Immigration Services can enact the immigration and deportation proceedings against accused group members. Moreover, individuals associated with FTO groups are ineligible for immigration relief and subject to travel bans, detainment, or deportation.  The Department of the Treasury can block assets and put pressure on US banks to sever financial ties with alleged group members (Cronin, 2003).  Individuals and groups that are designated as terrorists are banned from business transactions with US nationals or financial institutions that operate on US soil.  Entities associated with listed groups are banned from receiving donations from US nationals.  Those involved in the listing process may keep these potential consequences in mind as they decide on designation outcomes.     There is evidence that the FTO designation has had a number of effects on listed parties through the Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury.  Eighty people were convicted of providing material support to terrorists between 2009-2013.  The Treasury Department blocked $22 million in assets from members of seven of the 59 listed groups in 2103.2  Additionally, more than 1,000 people were denied entry to the United States between 2009 and 2014 at border control for connection to FTO groups.  Three people were deported for FTO connections in 2013 and 2014.  Between 2009 and 2013, the State Department denied 1,069 
                                                        2 All assets were blocked from members of al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbollah, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  No assets were blocked from members of any of the other 52 groups.   
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nonimmigrant visas and 187 immigrant visas to people with connections to FTOs (GAO, 2105).  In addition, The Foreign Terrorist Organization list was mentioned in roughly 2,100 legal opinions between 1997 and 2009.  Since 2005, roughly one legal opinion comes out each day that references a participant’s connection to an FTO-listed group (Breinhart, 2009).    Beyond the FTO list, the US maintains a number of other lists that often work in tandem with the FTO.  The Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list, created by Executive Order 13224, designates foreign individuals, groups, and entities with ties to terror.  The Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) list, created under Executive Order 12947, lists individuals and entities who threaten Middle East peace.  The Specially Designated Nationals list acts as a catch-all list maintained by the Office of Foreign Asset Control.  These lists serve a “naming and shaming” function.  It advertises that certain people and groups should not gain access to world financial institutions and creates liability for those institutions.  This list acts as a check transactions by placing penalties on banks that may be tempted to process terrorist funds. The list has less of an impact on counterterror actions in other U.S. agencies (Brienholt, 2014).  The Secretary of State also controls the State Sponsors of Terrorism list under the Export Administration Act (section 6(j)), Arms Control Export Act (section 40), and the Foreign Assistance Act (section 620A).  All lists claim to subject those listed to a number of different sanctions depending on what legislation applies.  However, the FTO list stands apart from the others by having specified legal consequences for listing.  
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While there are many different lists, I am primarily focused on the FTO list.  This list is most comparable with the lists available in other states.  Since I expect members of listed groups to show up on individual watch lists, communicating about groups will accomplish the same goals for leaders as communicating about certain individuals most of the time.  Both will provide information about what is and is not a threat to the state and about certain counterterror measures taken by the state.   This dissertation is a study of how elites and the public communicate about terrorism, and specifically the role that terrorist watch lists play in creating that discourse.  It looks at three facets of communication relating to terrorist watch lists.  In the next chapter, I examine what factors affect the listing process.  That is, I look at what characteristics of listed and unlisted groups matter to those in charge of the listing, as well as what geopolitical concerns are weighed by listing states.  In Chapter Two, I examine the process dynamics of decision-making about the terrorist watch list in the United States.  I explore what topics shape the context of counterterror policy in discourse and how listing plays out through the policy process.  I investigate how individual interests affect listing in the American context.  In Chapter Three, I look at the effect of listing and political interests on how certain groups are treated in media coverage of events.  Together, the work of this dissertation underlines the importance of the definition of terrorism in the overall policy-making process.    
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CHAPTER 1 
What Groups Are Listed and What Accounts for Their Listing? 
 According to Norris, Kern and Just (2003), the War on Terror offers a post-Cold War re-framing of American perspectives on foreign policy.   Terrorism is now the main lens that the public uses to distinguish between friends and enemies in the international sphere.  Reframing terrorism as the major concern of domestic security is then used to justify US action and policy decisions, and give politicians a strong, simple story to sell these policy decisions to the public.  Foreign policy issues that fit into the frame of the War on Terror receive attention, while issues that fall outside this device suffer.   However, the preeminence of terrorism as a foreign policy concern is not limited to the United States.  Numerous countries have created terrorist watch lists to aid in the public consumption of counterterrorism information since September 11, 2001.   Ideally, terrorist watch lists would correctly identify threats and publicize those threats in such a way as to reduce the ability of a group to commit violent acts.  The public would be able to reference terrorist watch lists in order to have a firm understanding of how public policy related to the goals of counterterror.  However, the process by which groups and individuals are added to watch lists is unclear.  It seems that intelligence and law enforcement recommendations play a large role in 
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determining listing status, but the obscurity of the listing process means that effectiveness of listing choices, as well as the level of accountability of decision-makers for correct identification, is not necessarily clear to outside observers (Nunn, 2005).  The terrorist watch list may be an example of the “simplicity constraint” that faces decision-makers (Stiglitz, 1998).  According to Stiglitz, those in government have incentives to discuss policy in ways that can be best understood by the majority of people, which reduces the role of complicated processes of decision-making in discourse.  The simplicity constraint is aggravated by the need for secrecy in security policy, which also constrains public discourse.  Lists offer audiences a short, easily understood amount of information about threat at the expense of explaining the nuances that make a group seem dangerous to insiders.  The lists are a first output of policy, and that makes understanding what qualities have induced listing hard to decipher.  A primary goal of this work is to discuss not only who gets listed, but also what the implications of listing are for the actors who create lists and those groups that find themselves listed.  For states, it is especially important to know which groups are listed and why in order to explain policy decisions and apparent deviations from stated policies.   States may use listing to influence not just their public’s perceptions of certain groups, but also the perceptions of other states.  China, for example, specifically asked for the international community to ban the activities of East Turkestan groups that threaten the Chinese government in its terrorist list announcement (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
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United States of America, 2003).  Lists then act as a foreign policy tool that can influence the counterterror actions others take.  Lists may contextualize what counterterror measures a given state implements, so knowledge of how groups are chosen for listing is important to overall understanding of counterterror.   This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I discuss some characteristics of violent groups that may make them more likely to be designated as a terrorist group and added to an official terrorist watch list by a given actor.  Second, I examine the terrorist watch lists of 14 countries and the European Union.  Third, I look further into the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, the official watch list of the United States.  The FTO list has existed in some form since the mid-1970s, providing a means for studying how policy interests have shifted over time.   
 
Group Characteristics Nunn (2005) has noted that various watch lists are part of the counterterror system within the United States.  Watch lists are a means to disseminate data about possible threats to the public.  In the US and other states, watch lists play a role in the information systems that underlies counterterrorism policy that is meant to prevent future terror attacks.  A number of characteristics of violent groups may influence whether or not a group receives a terrorist designation.  This chapter tests some of the most commonly held arguments about why violent groups may incite foreign policy concerns for states.  When foreign policy drives terrorist watch listing, violent groups that share certain characteristics should be more likely to be 
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listed.  Four possible characteristics of groups that may influence their listing status are discussed below.    First, the level of violence of a group may influence listing states.  The more destructive a group, or the more lives put in danger by a group’s actions, the more likely that group is to come to the attention of states.  Violence against states and civilians is generally considered a primary indicator of terrorism by most common definitions of the term.  As groups become more violent, they are more likely to receive higher levels of media attention and the state is more likely to garner increased public support for countermeasures.  As the recent actions by Boko Haram indicate, increasing levels of violence can lead to questions about why groups were not listed sooner (Gbadebo, 2012; Roach, 2012)   Second, the characteristics of a group’s targets may affect the likelihood of listing.  Beyond those violent groups that operate domestically, states are likely to care about the stability and safety of their allies.  Groups that threaten ally governments or can potentially cause physical harm to the listing state’s interests, or operate in close proximity to the listing state may be more likely to be listed.  Threats to neighboring states or to countries in which the listing state has military operations may be more likely to be taken as the actions of terrorists.  In addition, normative beliefs about what kinds of government are legitimate may influence how groups are viewed.  For democracies, that may mean that groups fighting in democratic states may be more likely to be listed than those fighting an autocratic state.  Democratic states would supposedly offer more nonviolent outlets for protest, making the use of violence more normatively bad.  All listing states may 
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care more about events in states that are like them politically or economically more than they might care about groups acting in states with which they have less close ties.  In the aftermath of September 11, groups with violent Islamic ideologies may also be more likely to be listed than other violent groups.    Third, states are likely to act against groups that threaten their foreign interests.  In addition to the being more likely to list threats to their foreign military operations, states may be more concerned with groups that threaten major economic interests.  Groups operating against trading partners may be more at risk for terrorist group designation than groups operating against states that are less important economically.  Groups that could destabilize economic partnerships may be more likely to be listed in an attempt to hinder their ability to affect the target state.    Finally, states may be more likely to care about groups threatening states that they interact with the most frequently.  The more actors interact with each other, the more chances those actors will have to pass information between them.  States that interact frequently through international forums may have more opportunity to communicate and bargain about possible terrorist groups.  Friendlier states are more likely to consider each other’s threats as terrorist groups.   States can interact in multiple international forums over time, and the more connected a state is, the more influence that state may have over others’ conceptions of terrorism.    
The Composition of Terrorist Watch Lists in 14 Countries and the European Union 
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 This section looks at the 2012 watch lists of fourteen countries plus the list disseminated by the European Union.  The countries included are listed in the Table 1.1 below. Many of these countries have been at the forefront of counterterror operations (United States, United Kingdom, Australia) or have seen high levels of violence within the country over the past decade (India, Pakistan, Egypt).  Countries with easily accessible watch lists tend to be either the Western states that have claimed a normative high ground for counterterror actions or those states that are often the focus of those operations.  Other states, such as China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, are possibly using their lists to put pressure on groups that they find threatening.   Table 1.1: Most Recent Watch Lists in 14 Countries and the European Union.    
Collected Watch Lists Australia Canada China Egypt European Union India Japan Kazakhstan New Zealand Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia Turkey United Kingdom United States   Overall, 194 groups are listed as a terrorist group by at least one state in the sample in 2012.  There is wide variation in the number of groups a state claims to list.  India’s list features 92 listed groups, while Egypt lists just two.  This difference is possibly because Egypt started publicly listing so recently.  Egypt began claiming groups were on their terrorist watch list following the unrest of the Arab Spring, while other states have been listing for much longer.  It seems that states must feel a potential domestic terrorist threat to start the listing process.  Therefore, states with 
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domestic terrorist threats or those that feel they are likely to be targeted, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, tend to have more comprehensive and longer-lasting listing procedures.   As terrorist watch lists become more prominent features of foreign policy, it makes sense that more states would attempt to use them to shape opinions about domestic groups. Table 1.2 presents simple statistics relating to the groups listed by each state.  Table 1.3 shows corresponding statistics for the groups out of the 194 total that are unlisted by each state, along with the t-score of difference in means tests between the listed and unlisted groupings for all states that have more than 10 groups listed.  China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have so few groups listed that any comparisons are likely to be skewed.  Therefore, they are dropped from the t-tests and the logistic regressions below.   The t-tests indicate that there are some differences in how individual states approach the categorization of violent groups.  Russia, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Kazakhstan and the EU show statistically significant differences in the regime type of the listed group’s state of origin versus unlisted groups.  Russia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Kazakhstan seem more likely to list groups operating out of more autocratic regimes, while India and the EU are more likely to list groups operating in more democratic states.  Many listing states seem more likely to list those groups that are responsible for higher numbers of death and destruction, with five states seeing statistically significant differences between the higher levels of deaths attributed to listed groups than to those they choose not to designate.  
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Average Number of 
Deaths Attributed to 
Listed Groups 
Average Exports 
between Listing State 
and Origin State of 
Listed Groups 
Average Distance between 
Listing State's Capital and 
Origin State of Listed 
Groups 
Number of Listed 
Groups from Islamic 
States (and percent of 
total) 
USA 52 4.8 469 people 4402  (Million $USD) 5910 (mi.) 32 (61.5) 
China 4 1.5 2 0 2284 0 (0.0) 
Russia 18 1.3 697 332 1483 12 (66.7) 
UK 62 5.1 268 6303 2638 32 (51.6) 
Canada 50 3.7 647 498 5547 34 (68.0) 
India 92 4.8 301 590 2119 41 (44.6) 
Australia 18 2.3 801 372 7623 15 (83.3) 
New Zealand 73 2.8 328 163 8987 47 (64.4) 
Turkey 11 5.8 351 833 392 4 (36.4) 
Pakistan 43 0.5 233 328 198 42 (97.7) 
Japan 13 5.4 52 1850 5539 7 (53.8) 
Kazakhstan 14 1.5 819 1129 2349 5 (35.7) 
Saudi Arabia 5 -6.5 725 764 607 5 (100.0) 
Egypt 2 0 53 319 373 2 (100.0) 
EU 27 6.5 312 60853 3095 11 (40.7) 
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and Origin State 
of Unlisted 
Groups 
USA 3.8  (-1.03) 112 people  (-2.93)*** 8465  (Million $USD) (1.13) 5730 (mi.)  (-0.58) 
China 4.1 (N/A) 218 (N/A) 9422 (N/A) 3817 (N/A) 
Russia 4.4 (2.15)* 161 (-2.91)*** 1883 (1.52) 2397 (3.11)*** 
UK 3.6 (-1.69) 186 (-0.69) 3130 (-2.44)** 3385 (3.42)*** 
Canada 4.2 (0.44) 56 (-4.97)*** 6146 (0.98) 5738 (0.07) 
India 3.4 (-1.70*) 125 (-1.59) 1263 (1.73*) 2406 (0.87) 
Australia 4.2 (1.22) 149 (-3.58)*** 1530 (1.47) 7969 (0.83) 
New Zealand 4.7 (2.19)** 137 (-1.68)* 157 (-0.09) 9106 (0.52) 
Turkey 4.0 (-0.98) 204 (-0.62) 612 (-0.48) 2398 (4.55)*** 
Pakistan 5.4 (5.60)*** 208 (-0.18) 253 (-0.38) 2577 (7.01)*** 
Japan 4.0 (-0.70) 225 (0.80) 5918 (0.56) 4764 (-1.83)* 
Kazakhstan 4.3 (1.73)* 163 (-3.19)*** 202 (-4.60)*** 2422 (0.17) 
Saudi Arabia 4.3 (N/A) 199 (N/A) 2540 (N/A) 2337 (N/A) 
Egypt 4.1 (N/A) 215 (N/A) 238 (N/A) 2454 (N/A) 
EU 3.7 (-2.13)** 196 (-0.74) 34347 (-1.40) 3028 (-0.23) *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01   The United Kingdom and Kazakhstan show statistically significant differences in economic ties between those groups that are listed and those that are not.  Groups operating in states that receive higher levels of exports from the United Kingdom and Kazakhstan are more likely to be listed.   Russia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Pakistan seem more likely to list groups that operate close to home, while Japan seems more likely to list groups operating at greater distances. 
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Overall, these simple statistics and t-tests suggest that there may be differences in how states approach the process of listing violent groups.  Different characteristics play a role in determining listing status depending on what goals the listing state hopes to accomplish with their designations.  Further testing in the chapter examines whether or not these differences affect the chances that a group is listed by a certain state.     
Group Differences and the Likelihood of Designation In addition to the simple comparisons above, I look at what characteristics of groups could play a role in determining whether or not they will end up on a watch list.  Based on the earlier discussion of group characteristics that may potentially bring them to the attention of listing entities, I use binomial logistic regression to estimate the likelihood that a group would end up listed by one of these actors.  Because of the small size of their reported lists, China, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are not included in these estimations.  I first discuss how the variables used are operationalized before discussing results.    
Dependent Variable  Each logistic regression presented in this chapter analyzes how characteristics of violent groups and their host states affect the likelihood of any group being listed by a set of 13 states plus the European Union.  This analysis uses the 2012 terrorist watch list for each actor.  In each case, the dependent variable is coded as ‘1’ if that group was listed by the state and ‘0’ otherwise.  
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Independent Variables The binomial logistic regressions presented here look at five characteristics of groups and their host states that are hypothesized to affect the likelihood of listing.   Most data covers the period from 2001-2012.  Many states started keeping more visible lists in the aftermath of September 11, so this time period covers the conditions groups have been operating in during the time when they are most open to a designation process.  
Polity Score 
 Listing states may feel more threatened by nonstate agents acting against states that are more “like” themselves.  Democratic states may be more likely to designate groups that are acting in democratic or transitioning states.  These groups are breaking international norms in support of democratic governance.  This variable takes an 11-year average of the Polity score for the state in which each group primarily operates.  The average of each states’ scores from 2001 to 2012 is included in the regression.  Some states’ averages are from shorter time periods in cases in which single years have been coded as regime interruption.  The Polity average is coded as missing for those states for which most years have Polity scores indicating regime interruption.    
Casualties  More violent and more lethal groups may be more likely to be listed as terrorist organizations.  The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) presents data about the number of deaths attributed to a group.  In order to capture how violent a group 
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may seem to listing states, the sum of deaths over the 2001 to 2012 time period is included in the regression.    
Trade Differential  Since states will want to maintain relationship with other states that benefit them economically, groups that threaten stability in important trade partners may be more likely to be listed.  The average level of exports over a 10-year period from 1999 to 2009 was collected from the Correlates of War (COW) project for all actors except the European Union.  The European Commission’s Eurostat data has been used for the same data for the EU.  All trade data has been converted to 2012 US dollars.   
Neighbor Status  Listing states may be more concerned about possible threats to the status quo that occur closer to home.  This dummy variable is coded as ‘1’ if the group operates primarily in the listing state, a neighboring state, a state in which the listing entity has a foreign military installation, or a state that borders a foreign military operation.  The variable is coded ‘0’ otherwise.    
International Organization Network Variables 
 Actors may wish to push for listing of certain groups when those groups threaten their status quo.  States that are more connected may have more influence over others’ decisions regarding listing.  International organization membership offers opportunities for states to negotiate over the status of groups.  States that are more connected through international organization membership may make agreements about the listing status of certain groups.   Network analysis offers a 
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number of measurements that may capture network dynamics.  Membership in 88 international organizations have been inputted into an affiliation matrix where states were coded as ‘1’ if the state was a member of a particular organization and ‘0’ otherwise.  The affiliation matrix was then used to calculate a sociomatrix, which gives the distribution of ties between actors across the network.   Two network variables were then calculated.  First, closeness centrality calculates the length of the path between two agents, giving an estimate of how close the actors are and how long an idea or action would take to pass from one to the other.  Second, Eigenvector centrality incorporates the number of links between actors, the strength of those links, and the level of centrality to give a weighted estimate of how connected any two actors in the network would be (Hafner-Burton et al, 2009).     
Results  Table 1.4 shows the results of being listed by a specified country given the relationship between the listing state and the level of democracy, economic ties, and network ties of a group’s target.   The geographic relationship between a group and the listing entity is also captured, as well as a group’s relative level of violence and whether or not a group operates in an Islamic state.  Alternative operationalizations of the regression are presented in the Appendix.  The results indicate that a number of characteristics have a statistically significant impact on the probability of a group being listed by certain states.  In general, however, very little of the hypothesized characteristics have any significant effects on the probability of being listed for any given state.  The level of violence of  
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  Table 1.4: Logistic Regression Results for 12 States 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01 
 USA Russia United 
Kingdom Canada India Australia New Zealand Turkey Pakistan Japan Kazakhstan European Union 
Origin 
State is 
Democracy 0.051 (0.485) -0.347 (0.881) -0.070 (0.470) -0.039 (0.548) -1.20 (0.490)** -0.001 (0.898) -1.04 (0.469)** 2.92 (2.11) -0.134 (1.35) 0.944 (1.05) -1.58 (0.916)* 1.064 (0.674) 
Deaths 
Attributed 





0.006 (0.499) -1.59 (1.56) -1.33 (0.321)*** -0.829 (0.643) 0.406 (0.249)* -0.770 (1.44) -0.764 (1.00) -1.25 (1.22) -0.764 (0.950) 1.50 (1.27) -1.00 (0.897) -0.195 (0.330) 
Closeness  -20.6 (6.74)** -5.59 (11.7) 4.86 (5.99) -6.62 (6.65) -1.81 (5.69) -1.44 (10.6) -5.99 (5.12) 27.9 (21.4) -3.76 (14.2) -0.341 (11.3) -21.6 (10.5)** -3.65 (7.61) 
Exports 
(log) -0.132 (0.146) -0.050 (0.297) 0.096 (0.153) -0.209 (0.152) -0.482 (0.203)** 0.071 (0.147) -0.198 (0.965)** 0.338 (0.511) -0.091 (0.487) 0.063 (0.222) 0.543 (0.175)** -0.222 (0.162) 
Islamic 
State -0.493 (0.580) 2.07 (1.37) 0.720 (0.594) 0.498 (0.632) 0.033 (0.563) 1.69 (1.13) -0.129 (0.503) 0.000 (0.00) 2.26 (1.30)* -0.020 (1.11) -0.829 (1.07) -0.950 (0.740) 
Constant 12.9 (5.72)** 12.0 (14.8) 4.98 (4.61) 10.1 (7.32) 0.830 (4.41) 2.01 (15.5) 11.4 (10.0) -16.1 (17.8) 4.11 (14.7) -16.4 (14.4) 18.2 (11.2) 3.46 (5.55) 
N 172 167 174 173 146 175 175 87 138 174 168 184 
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 groups has a small positive effect on listing in the United States, while high level of ties between the US and the state of origin within international organizations makes listing less likely.  Only the level of violence attributed to a group significantly affects listing probability for Russia and Canada. The United Kingdom is likely to list groups operating in closer geographical proximity, although the effect is negligible.  The significance of this variable for the UK is probably a result of the high number of Irish terror groups listed.   India, New Zealand, and Kazakhstan are statistically less likely to list a group operating in a democratic state.  A group operating in a country with high levels of exports from New Zealand and India also has a lower probability of being listed. High levels of exports to the origin country have a positive effect on listing probability for Kazakhstan.  In addition, India is more likely to list groups that operate in closer geographic proximity, although this has negligible effects. The significance is probably due to having a substantial number of groups operating in Kashmir on the official watch list.  Kazakhstan is also statistically more likely to list more violent groups.  No characteristics are shown to have significant effects on listing likelihood for Australia, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, or the European Union.  The marginal effects graphs below help demonstrate the effects of some of the characteristics of groups at different points.  The amount of violence attributed to a group has an almost flat and small effect on listing probability for most states.  Higher death counts generally increase the likelihood of listing, but by very small amounts.  The United States and Canada are more dramatically likely to list groups 
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with high levels of attributed deaths.  A number of states see almost flat effects on probability of listing given levels of economic interest in the origin state of a group.  Notably, India, the European Union, New Zealand, the United States and Canada see drops in probability of listing as economic ties in the form of exports become higher.  Pakistan and Kazakhstan show opposite effects, with the probability of listing a group rising when the group operates in a state receiving high levels of exports.  Figure 1.1: Marginal Effects of Level of Violence of a Group on Listing Probability 
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Figure 1.2: Marginal Effects of Export Levels on Listing Probability 
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difference in listing probability for groups operating close by versus those operating at greater distances.  India looks more likely to list groups operating father away, while the likelihood of listing decreases with longer distances from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey, and Russia.   Figure 1.4: Marginal Effects of Physical Distance on Listing Probability 
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If designation has effects on group treatment by either members of the domestic or international community, then listing can act as a force for government policy and this force is not checked by an understood definition of what makes a terrorist for any given state.  When terrorist watch lists are this flexible, decision-makers may have incentives to use this tool to shape policy to their advantage.    The next section discusses the listing practices of the United States in more detail.  The United States has been keeping public watch lists for more then three decades, offering a longer time series to examine how the incentives of decision-makers can shape policy.  The definition of terrorism in the US has been a moving target for some time.  As the results above show, that uncertainty may have given policy makers over the lifespan of the watch list means to focus on some violent groups at the expense of others.   
 
 
The Foreign Terrorist Organization List Over Time The United States has claimed counterterrorism as a foreign policy interest since at least the mid-1970s.  This time series allows for examination of how powerful states’ conceptualization of terrorism has shifted as policy concerns have changed.  The results above suggest that patterns of designation choice are as often driven by idiosyncratic concerns related to a single group as they are likely to be motivated by regular and predictable characteristics and activities.  These results 
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suggest that states’ definition of terrorism is more or less guided by domestic interests and the need to shape a domestic counterterror policy process.   The Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list offers one way to study how policy concerns in the United States have affected the conception of terrorism over time.  These concerns filter through the FTO list and affect which groups are likely to be designated at a given time.  Building on the introduction’s history of watch listing in the United States, I explain the data and methods used in this section below before considering the results.    






Score of Host 
Country 
Avg. US Exports 










14.8 3/31 3.8 5030.34 15,893,  1.1  (10.0) 57,294; 4.0  (51.1) 
Listed 
Groups 
5.1 0/33 5.0 4437.29 19,896  15.2 (37.7) 61,586 47.1 (167.7)  
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My dataset accounts for all terrorist groups listed by the United States from 1976 to 2010.  For years in which the government released a designated list (1976, 1986-2010), these lists are used to track officially designated groups.  For the nine years that do not include an official list, the terrorist groups are taken from the 























Many groups operate using violent tactics but have not ended up on a terrorist watch list.  In order to collect unlisted groups to use as a comparison, I collected data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  The GTD lists every violent event for a given year, along with information on the perpetrators of violence, the target, and casualties.  I created a dataset that includes every violent group that operated for at least three years.  Attributed groups operating for less than that amount of time may not have attracted the attention of intelligence communities and may be better thought of as “lone wolves” or those with singular grievances that would not affect terrorist policy.  I have excluded any groups listed that acted on behalf of a sitting government, such as the Iranian police force. While researchers such as those responsible for the GTD may consider such acts as extra-legal violence that should be included as “terrorism,” it seems reasonable to assume that states and policy-makers will approach such state-sponsored violence differently.  Such groups seem unlikely to appear on the US foreign terrorist organization list. Over 34 years of terrorist group designation, the US government listed 183 terrorist groups.  There are 284 unlisted but long-lasting violent groups in the dataset over the timespan.  These unlisted groups offer a means to compare listed entities to those violent groups that the United States does not label as terrorists.  In this analysis, the dependent variable is again whether or not a group is listed by the United States in a given year.  The independent variables also mirror those used above, as I would expect that the US is motivated by similar international concerns to any other powerful state.  
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 Since I expect political interests to shape the list, some groups should be more likely to be listed than others.  The conception of a terrorist group for the United States will be shaped by how that violent group affects policy interests.  There are a number of possible interests that the US may weigh when determining terrorist list designation.  First, extra-state violence is likely to be threatening, so more violent groups in terms of damages and civilian deaths should be more likely to be listed.  Second, I expect that states that are ideologically closer to the US will be more likely to have groups active in their territories listed.  That is, the US is more likely to list groups acting against states that the US feels close to.  Terrorist groups in democracies should be listed more, as well as states where the US has strong military and economic ties.  Additionally, states that the US is more likely to interact with through international organizations and diplomacy should be more likely to see violent groups listed.  US interest in the Middle East may mean groups active in that region are more likely to get listed.  These hypotheses are listed below: 
o H1: More violent groups are more likely to be listed 
o H2: Groups operating in democratic states are more likely to be listed 
o H3: Groups acting in states where the US has military ties are more likely to be listed 
o H4: Groups operating in states where the US has strong economic interests are more likely to be listed 
o H5: The US is more likely to list groups acting in states with which the US interacts frequently through international organizations 
o H6: Groups operating in the Middle East are more likely to be listed.    I have collected a number of covariates that could help explain when certain groups are listed by the United States.  In order to conceptualize how violent a group may be considered, I have collected the number of civilians killed by a given group in a year. The measure of those killed is from the Global Terrorism database.   
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A binomial logitistic regression was performed and results are presented in Table 1.6.  Generally, most of the variables seem to be statistically significant and in the expected direction.  Only H2, predicting the relationship between targeted regime type and violent group listing, seems unstable and fails to reach significance.  Otherwise, we see preliminary confirmation of the other hypotheses.  Group violence, military and economic ties present significant results in the expected directions.  As with the results in the previous section, H5, relating to ties between international organizations is not confirmed.  The results are significant, but indicate that higher levels of tie through organizations reduce the likelihood that a group will be listed.  However, looking at marginal effects is very helpful in interpreting the results of logit regressions. We can see the results of margins analysis graphically in Figures 1.6 – 1.8.  Table 1.6: Binomial Logistic Regression, 1976-2010 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Civilians Killed 0.632 (0.019)*** 0.679 (0.021)*** 0.684 (0.021)*** 0.723 (0.023)*** 0.722 (0.023)*** 0.758 (0.024)*** 
Polity Score   0.035 (0.005)*** 0.029 (0.006)*** -0.021 (0.007)*** -0.020 (0.008)** 0.006 (0.009) 
Presence of US 
Military Bases 
    0.292 (0.078)*** 0.843 (0.095)*** 0.867 (0.118)*** 0.955 (0.123)*** 
US Exports to 
Host State (log) 
      0.146 (0.025)*** 0.150 (0.028)*** 0.148 (0.028)*** 
IO Connections         -0.010 (0.028) -0.010 (0.029) 
Middle East State           1.43 (0.143)*** 
Constant -2.79 (0.35)*** -3.03 (0.048)** -3.08 (0.051)*** -4.30 (0.177)** -4.29 (0.178)*** -4.58 (0.186)*** 
N 15,808 14,134 14,134 12,131 12,131 12,131 Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
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As shown, increasing connections through international organizations decreases the probability of being listed as a foreign terrorist organization.  An increasing share of US exports into a country increases the likelihood of a group operating within that state being listed as an FTO.  The effects of both of these variables are small, but they could possibly add up to make a difference in how a group is treated.  Extremely violent groups are very likely to be listed as an FTO, but a certain amount of violence does not mean a group is automatically listed.  Death tolls are very high before a group is more likely to be listed than not.  The results show more uncertainty about the listing prospects of a Middle Eastern group than groups operating in other regions, but they still seem more likely to be listed overall.     Figure 1.6: Probability: Listing | Number of Civilians Killed;    Figure 1.7: Probability: Listing | US Export Share 
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 Figure 1.8: Probability: Listing | Shared International Organization Connections                  A primary hypothesis of this work is that the terrorist watch list should reflect policy concerns of the list makers.  While more work is done on this theory in the next chapter, one way to test that hypothesis is to disaggregate the US watch list to see how it changes over time.  The watch list covers three full decades – the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  These years saw different foreign policy concerns dominate public debate, from the final years of Cold War politics to the Bosnian conflict to the rise of China and increased focus on security policy after 9/11.  The presence of the terrorist watch list throughout different foreign policy focuses suggests that counterterrorism has been a background concern for some time, and that certain events can bring that concern to the forefront.  The foreign policy process is generally thought to be event-driven, with issues gaining inertia once they enter to public consciousness (Wood and Peake, 1998).  Therefore, events that take foreign policy focus through domestic media attention, such as the Iran hostage 
 44 
crisis, the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, or the recent events in Syria and Iraq are likely to focus foreign policy attention.  Once attention has been placed, those issues are likely to keep affecting future policies including which groups gain enough attention to be placed on the terrorist watch list.   Important events in the 1980, 1990s, and 2000s could all have shaped the composition of the terrorist watch list.  Major world events shift attention for the government and the public to certain sources of threat at the expense of others.  When those threats are the most salient, the limited attention of the media, public, and decision-makers means that certain groups and group characteristics may be more prone to listing than others (Wood and Peake, 1998). In addition, the events of 9/11 mean that the 2000s saw a huge increase in salience of counterterrorism policies in general, even though counterterrorism and the terrorist watch list existed in the 1980s and 1990s.   Differences in issue salience and focus may result in differences in the composition of the FTO list over time.     I have re-run the above logistic regression for each decade separately and present the results in Table 1.7 below.  Many characteristics significantly affect the probability of being listed in each decade.  The number of deaths attributed to a group significantly and positively affects the likelihood of listing in each decade, although the effect is generally small.  In the 1980s, groups fighting in more democratic regimes were more likely to be listed, while the regime type had no effect in the 1990s, and those fighting in less democratic regimes were more likely to be listed in the 2000s.  The presence of military bases in the country in which the groups primarily operate makes listing more likely in all time periods.   
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 Table 1.7: Logistic Regression by Time Period   1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Deaths Attributed (log) 0.758 (0.043)*** 0.789 (0.046)*** 0.748 (0.047)*** 
Polity Score of Origin State 0.042 (0.016)** 0.051 (0.051)*** -0.077 (0.018)*** 
Military Bases in Origin 
State 
0.472 (0.217)** 1.34 (0.270)*** 1.08 (0.202)*** 
US Exports to Origin State 
(log) 
0.050 (0.065) 0.098 (0.048)** 0.343 (0.057)*** 
International Organization 
Ties 
0.184 (0.053)*** -0.129 (0.060)** -0.100 (0.051)** 
Middle Eastern Origin 
State 
1.95 (0.280)*** 1.77 (0.293)*** 1.51 (0.250)*** 
Constant -4.72 (0.394)*** -4.03 (0.311)*** -5.27 (0.400)*** 
N 3,400 3,368 3,367 Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01   Economic ties do not have statistically significant effects on the probability of listing in the 1980s, but have positive effects in the 1990s and 2000s.  There is no statistically significant effect of international organization ties between states of origin and the United States in the 1980s, but groups operating in states with high levels of organization ties to the US are less likely to be listed in the 1990s and 2000s.  Groups operating in the Middle East are more likely to be listed in every decade.    Marginal effects graphs (available in the Appendix) can again help show the differences in how certain group characteristics affect listing.  The graphs illustrate the differences in probability of listing for certain characteristics by decade.  While high levels of attributed deaths make any group extremely likely to be designated as a terrorist, the effect is less certain in the 1980s than in later periods.  Economic ties have no clear effect in the 1980s and very unclear effects in the 1990s.  Marginal 
 46 
effects of economic ties on the probability of listing in the 2000s suggest that greater ties make designation somewhat more likely overall.  Groups operating in highly democratic states have lower probabilities of being listed in the 2000s, but seemingly increasing chances of being listed in the 1980s and 1990s.  Ties to states through international organizations lower the likelihood of listing in the 1990s and 2000s.  The effect of organizational ties is not strong in the 1980s, but is possibility positively tied to the choice to list a group.    
Conclusion The results imply that not just foreign policy concerns matter in determining how states view a violent group.  Security concerns that might seem to play key roles in determining which violent group is listed fail to show significant effects in many instances.  Instead, it seems likely that terrorist watch lists are the result of the interaction between foreign policy and domestic political processes.  Domestic interests can shape how violent political groups are approached and how further counterterror policy is created.    Looking at just the list outcomes gives a murky picture of how states conceptualize and publicize terrorist threats.  The results of this chapter need to be considered more closely in the context in which the decision to designate or not was made.  In the next chapter, I will look closely at the role of the political system in listing outcomes.  As Stiglitz (1998) notes in his evaluation of Pareto sub-optimal economic outcomes, expert opinion, like that which is supposedly used to determine designation status, is a step removed from policy outcomes because experts inside 
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the government are not subject to electoral constraints that can shift policy.  The outcome of listing decisions needs to be understood as the interaction between expert intelligence and political incentives that favor certain outcomes and oversight procedures.   Even a truly ad hoc process of designation matters because the designation status of a group plays a role in how the group is likely to be treated by politicians, the media, and the public.  Domestic politics should play a major role in counterterrorism policy since the primary concern of counterterror policy usually relates to keeping the homeland safe.  Terrorism policy is tied to opinions and interests of domestic actors, which is the subject of the next chapter.  The political implications and impacts of listing will be discussed later in the dissertation.     
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CHAPTER 2 
How Do Groups Get Listed? 
 Chapter 1 highlighted a number of conceivable characteristics of groups and states that influence ultimate listing outcomes.  If designation is a political process that takes these characteristics into account, we should see interactions between government actors over the FTO list.  This chapter looks more closely one potential source of variation in listing outcomes in the United States: the role of interests throughout the designation process.  That is, I examine how domestic and international contexts impact decisions about listing.  Designation is a political process in which certain actors may seek to have influence depending on their personal stakes in the listing outcome. I theorize that we should especially see bargaining between the bureaucracy and Congress.  My central argument is that terrorist watch lists act as a way to shape discourse about terrorist threat and American response.  The process of listing then influences our understanding of overall US policy interests.  As a 2003 Congressional Research Service report notes, the FTO list “has a unique importance not only because of the specific measures undertaken to thwart the activities of designated groups but also because of the symbolic, public role it plays as a tool of US counterterrorism policy.”  The FTO list itself is then subject to the interests of 
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those decision-makers that wish to shape public perceptions of terror threat and US actions.    As McCormick (2012) notes, American foreign policy is shaped by numerous factors, including the political institutions and individuals that make decisions and the culture in which these entities operate.  The fragmented nature of foreign affairs government encourages competition between parts of government over the decision-making and policy implementation process.  Both international and domestic concerns are likely to play a role in determining the kind of attention a potentially designated group receives.   In this chapter, I examine the political process of listing through two cases: Boko Haram and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA).  These groups both were subject to scrutiny over the decision to designate.  Both international and domestic pressures played a role in the debate over their listing status.  Throughout the chapter, I extend existing theories of government action and foreign policy analysis into a new issue area for an in-depth examination of the general designation policy process.  The results also shed light on the role of policy decisions in shaping public discourse.    The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I will introduce the cases.  Second, I discuss the role of the bureaucracy, and specifically the State Department in making listing decisions.  Third, I look at how interests vary in public discussions within the context of listing Boko Haram and RIRA and in general.  Finally, I look closely at factors that influence Congressional interests about these two groups and examine 
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characteristics that may impact Congressional concerns in other cases and in the future.  
Case Studies: Listing Boko Haram and the Real IRA Yin (1992) argues that case studies allow for consideration of “context as an essential part of the phenomena to be explained.”  The process of terrorist watch listing may be best examined through the method of process tracing the decisions to list groups or not.  Since I expect a variety of pressures to act upon decision-makers, cases offer a way to see when pressures exist and when they do not.  Cases allow for analysis of the decision-making process from a number of angles for groups that differ in their composition, scope, and impact on US interests.   Here, I look at two cases where the designation process saw input from a number of actors: Boko Haram and the Real Irish Republican Army.  I use these two cases to illustrate the political aspects of the process of listing.  These two groups highlight a number of influences on the designation process in the United States through the interests that actors brought to bear on the decision to list.  I will use the insights from the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA to discuss the political nature of the listing process more generally.  Below, I outline the basic timeline for FTO designation for both groups.  I will go into more detail throughout the chapter.   
Boko Haram Secretary of State John Kerry listed Nigerian group Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization on November 14, 2013, following over a year of negotiations over the group’s listing status.  Boko Haram became active during a period of religious unrest in the Nigerian state, but the group rose to prominence starting in 2009 as members reacted to increasingly violent tactics of the state with its own 
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violent operations, often aimed at Christians and other civilians.  In 2011, Boko Haram began to employ suicide attacks, attracting increased media attention.  The first such attack was against Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011, followed by attacks at the UN headquarters in Abuja in August 2011 (Cook, 2011).  The group also bombed a series of Christian churches on Christmas Day of that year, resulting in widespread condemnation (BBC News, 2011).   Following these violent acts, the Counterterrorism Bureau in the State Department initiated review of Boko Haram in 2012 on the recommendation of a number of other departments.  However, various interest groups, academics, and the Nigerian government opposed listing at the time, arguing that an official designation would harm Nigeria’s operations against the group while encouraging Boko Haram to target Western interests (LaFranchi, 2014).  Given the conflicting perceptions of the group in 2012, the State Department decided to compromise on its designation, even with lawmakers asking for its inclusion on the FTO list (Quinn, 2012).  Instead of listing the group as an FTO, three Boko Haram leaders were listed as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, subjecting these individuals to financial sanctions but sparing the group (Office of the Spokesperson, 2012).  In the end, the State Department had to decide whether designation would actually help the Nigerian government fight Boko Haram’s growing strength.  Even though the group met US legal requirements for listing, an initial review determined that designation would not help on the ground (Hirsh, 2014).   In 2013, the State Department revised its stance and listed the group and its offshoot, Ansaru, as FTOs.  In September of that year, Boko Haram killed over 160 
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civilians in Benisheik, Nigeria resulting in more calls for changing the group’s listing status (Office of the Spokesperson, 2013).  The level of violence of Boko Haram ultimately swayed the State Department’s decision to designation.  The delayed designation of the group as an FTO came under increased scrutiny after the 2014 abduction of more than 200 Nigerian schoolgirls, further illustrating how designation itself can be politicized.  Overall arguments for listing did not change between the initial review and designation.  Rather, Boko Haram’s use of violent tactics against civilians eventually overwhelmed opposing arguments for decision-makers within the Department of State.   
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) While listing Irish paramilitary groups had been a difficult question for US decision-makers, the Real Irish Republican Army was designated as an FTO on May 16, 2001.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was not listed in the inaugural FTO designation in 1997 in part because officials worried that designation would adversely harm the ongoing peace negotiations that would lead to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) (Murphy, 2011).  Additionally, a number of politicians opposed IRA designation on the grounds that the IRA never targeted American interests.  Moreover, politicians from the northeastern United States often represented large Irish constituencies that opposed designation (Murphy, 2011).  While IRA continued to be discussed in the State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism review until signing on to the GFA, it never has had official FTO status (Shane, 2011).   Proceedings to designate RIRA began after two major events in 1998 that shifted US sentiment so that designation was possible.  First, the Good Friday 
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Agreement was signed in April 1998.  Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom under the GFA, while a number of paramilitary groups operating in the region promised demilitarization following the accords.  The mentions of the IRA in 
Patterns of Global Terrorism stopped following their assent to the GFA (Moran, 2006).  However, hardliners from the IRA splintered to form RIRA and the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA).  Members of both these groups refused to acquiesce to the GFA’s calls for the normalization of British-Irish relations.  US officials that supported the GFA could then point to RIRA and CIRA as greater threats to British-Irish stability.  Second, RIRA claimed responsibility for the August 1998 Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland that killed 29 and injured more than 300 people.  The Omagh bombing was the largest single-day death total of the conflict, focusing counterterrorism official’s attention on RIRA rather than CIRA (Moran, 2006).  The State Department has an easier time designating groups that claim “credit” for violent events, so RIRA made a better candidate for listing than more shadowy Irish extremists (Cronin, 2011).  CIRA, which did not claim credit for as many violent events in the late 1990s, was not listed until 2004.  Scrutiny of the decision not to list the IRA contributed to the later decision to list RIRA and CIRA, with their non-signatory status to the GFA specifically cited as part of the reason for these designations (Murphy, 2011).    
Explaining Designation Generally These two cases help illustrate some common themes of the designation process.  Different decision-makers will bring distinctive interests to bear when 
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discussing potential threats and the role of the FTO list.  Public policy affects how information about terrorist groups is disseminated, and creates focal points around listing and delisting that interest groups and politicians may wish to use to their advantage (Pierson, 1993).  In addition, bargaining between possible decision makers is affected by those actors’ interest in appealing to outside audiences.  Decisions send signals about terrorist threats to audiences both domestic and international.  Each group of decision-makers may worry about how foreign policy outcomes related to listing affect opinions about competence that outside groups and the press may be quick to use to further their agendas (Groseclose and McCarty, 2001).   From the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA, we see that the interaction of these decision-makers matter in the overall outcome of listing.  We may generally expect that potentially listed groups will be subject to the consequence of interactions between the bureaucracy, members of Congress, and other interest groups.  The cases illustrate that Congress and the bureaucracy both care about the listing process.  In addition, domestic and international interests mediate the choices of listing and the way interested actors conceptualize terrorism and terror threats from certain groups.  I will explore these variations in interests more in the next sections.  First, I examine how the bureaucracy is involved in listing.  Next, I discuss how interests groups affect discussion of terrorist groups and the language surrounding the concept of terrorism and terror threats.  Finally, I demonstrate how individual characteristics shape Congressional interest in talking about terrorism.    
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The Role of the Bureaucracy  Various bureaucracies control terrorist watch lists and the process of designation.  Listing practices by bureaucracies are assumed to follow standard procedures from government delegation (Allison, 1971).  However, the decentralized authority of the bureaucracy may result in actions and perceptions that reflect the desires of decision-makers within the bureaucracy.  As seen in the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA, a number of agencies can be involved in decision-making surrounding listing, including the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).   These bureaucracies bargain for control over the power to designate and shape foreign policy against certain terrorist groups.   The listing procedures for the FTO list are given in in Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as follows: 
1. It must be a foreign organization. 
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain 
the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. 
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. These requirements are fairly vague, leaving it up to the agencies to determine what actions warrants a threat to US nationals or national security.  All agencies must work together to synthesize information about dangerous groups, but the ultimate listing decision has been designated as the job of the State Department since 1997.  
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Agency decision-making is affected by a number of attributes that have been studied previously.  The types of legislative controls in place affect the ability of bureaucrats to respond to changing conditions and to make independent decisions (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994).   Additionally, bureaucratic directives can privilege certain constituencies over others (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987).  In the case of terrorist groups, we see that interests outside the bureaucracy are part of the process of listing.  The State Department must weigh the influence of other agencies, foreign government, members of Congress and overall foreign policy objectives when making the decision to designate a group.  Bureaucracies also act within the political context of the time.  Changes in institutional makeup and procedure can affect beliefs about how other actors will respond to actions.  Even the threat of regulation over watch lists from Congress may be enough to change how bureaucrats treat list making, even if the individual bureaucrat’s preferences over a group do not shift (Shipan, 2004).  We see in the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA that bureaucrats within the State Department were aware of Congressional interests relating to the groups.  Bureaucracies may be interested in furthering their sphere of influence and so control over designation can be seen as a means to bargain for positioning counterterror policy towards the bureaucracy’s interests.  The international political context also matters in determining which groups are listed.  Since the final say for the list resides in the State Department, foreign policy concerns are likely to play a role in decision-making, as with the concerns that listing Boko Haram would further encourage violence by the group rather than 
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helping ease terrorism concerns in the region.  The Secretary of State can potentially keep groups from being listed if other concerns outweigh the benefits of formal listing.  Secretary of State Albright noted in 1999 that designating organizations is “likely…to attract coverage and provoke controversy in countries having an interest in one or more of the groups.”  Additionally, the possibility of legal challenges to designation affects how the FTO list is used.  Potential legal ramifications affect the view of threat by groups since a successful challenge could conceivably have foreign policy consequences in other issue areas. 
Interviews In order to gauge the influence of the bureaucracy on the designation process, I conducted interviews that will be used to illustrate the perception of the bureaucracy through the rest of the chapter.  These interviews helped clarify the process of listing, and the role that different actors play in the creation and use of the FTO list within the US bureaucracy.  To ascertain more about the decision to list a violent group, I spoke with Jason Blazakis, Directors of the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Designations in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the Department of State and Jeffrey Breinholt, a Counterterrorism Prosecutor at the National Security Division of the Department of Justice.  Both Mr. Blazakis and Mr. Breinholt are pivotal actors in determining which groups are designated.  They interact with a number of other decision-makers in order to reach designation agreement.    Mr. Blazakis and Mr. Breinholt spoke to me about a number of aspects of the listing process that can be seen as the basis of the designation process within the US 
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bureaucracy.  Their positions inside the bureaucracy offer greater insight into the thought processes behind listing and the roles that different actors fulfill through the designation process.   In addition, both interviews illuminate the perceived benefits of having a public designation of terrorist groups.  Understanding the intentions behind the FTO list is important for further discussion of how the notion of listing is treated by elites in the rest of this chapter.  At the most basic level, the question of designation seems to come down to the ability of actors within the Department of State to reach a consensus about status with outside actors.  As seen with Boko Haram and RIRA, multiple groups will seek to influence listing by coming out for or against designation.  Actors within other bureaucratic agencies often voice opinions about how listing will affect foreign policy objectives or the ability to fight terrorism domestically.   Mr. Blazakis noted that a number of actors are consulted to ensure that the government as a whole is behind a designation decision.  These actors include other regional and topical bureaus within the State Department, “elements of the national security community to include the intelligence community, like the CIA, NSA.  [The CT Bureau would] check with the White House, with the Department of Justice and Treasury, and FBI to make sure that what we’re proposing doesn’t impair their own equities.”  As Mr. Blazakis affirmed, the Counterterrorism Bureau “always [tries] to ensure that when we add a new group to the list that it’s essentially a decision made by consensus, so we get a sense of where everybody is before we actually start drafting what we call the administrative record, which is the legal basis for the designation.”   
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 The criteria of Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act are open to interpretation, and again these interviews suggest that reaching a consensus is important for ultimate listing decisions.  Mr. Blazakis asserts: “The legal criteria is essentially a national security threat to the United States to include economic interests, foreign policy interests, defense interests… You can make a very easy argument that pretty much any group you can think of is somehow a threat to US foreign policy, economic, defense interests.  So if there is a US presence there, if the US is providing money to that country, or foreign aid to that country, then obviously it is inherently in our national security interest that that country not get destabilized by groups that are carrying out violent activities. Therefore the group is a threat to US national security interests.”   This observation of Mr. Blazakis is supported by the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA.  In both instances, the debate over listing centered on the questions of whether or not actions within Nigeria and Ireland constituted threats to the national security of the United States.  The groups were active for years before US designation because decision-makers saw designation as unhelpful for fighting against the violence abroad.  Diplomatic or bilateral countermeasures were favored in both instances until the groups became too violent to ignore.  Eventually, attention to the groups’ violence reached a point at which listing became the preferred option.      One of the goals of the overall designation process is then to come to agreement about who should fall under the broad criteria set by the INA.  Listing is a bargaining process between various agencies that wish to see their interests prioritized.  As a result, the listing process is remarkably variable depending on the internal conflicts that designation touches upon. Mr. Blazakis states: “[The designation process] varies considerably [by group], sometimes anywhere from as short as a few months to sometimes multiple years because we’re working through disagreements that say, a geographic bureau may have with the Counterterrorism Bureau or another agency may have with the Counterterrorism Bureau about pursuing a designation.  We have to work through those concerns, so sometimes that can take a while.” 
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  We see this variation in the listing process for both Boko Haram and RIRA, as certain factions within the government sought designation while others resisted.  The listing process is a time period in which arguments about the goals of foreign policy in relation to nonstate violent groups can be made.  Ultimately, bargaining over listing is helpful for all involved because it creates a set of groups that are definitively seen as terrorist threats.  The overall process of designation puts all actors on the same legally supported page.  Designation is a signal of consensus between US agencies that can allow for further policy enactment against those groups that pass the listing stage.  The FTO list creates a set of groups and individuals subject to the consequences of the US legal system.  Initial designation precludes continuing definitional debates between decision-makers further into policy implementation.  As Mr. Breinholt emphasizes: “[Listing] takes away a lot of the otherwise political arguments that would surround those groups.  When the Secretary of State designates them, you won’t find anyone who’s accepted in polite company saying that Hamas is not a terrorist group, for example.  It takes a lot of the wind out of the people who like to argue definitions.”     Boko Haram and RIRA demonstrate the effect cutting off the discussion of the definition of terrorism.  Once listed, questions related to why the State had waited to list, not whether it should have (Cronin, 2011; LaFranchi, 2012).  Once the designation question is settled, focus turns to questions of appropriate US actions and consequences for those associated with FTOs.  As Mr. Breinholt explains: “The FTO process…drives all of our terrorism cases.  Eighty to ninety percent of all terrorism indictments include a material support to a terrorist organization charge.  It can be a throw-in to a far more grave [sic] situation.  It’s a very, very important mechanism that we have in the criminal justice system.  It would be Armageddon if we didn’t have it.”     
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Interests and Counterterror Discourse The Boko Haram and RIRA cases demonstrate that the previously discussed dynamics of the bureaucratic process do not fully explain how groups get listed in the United States.  Congress and the bureaucracy may be the main decision-makers involved in discussing terrorist watch lists, but they are likely to be affected by several forces that have both domestic and international interests.  Most prominently, the executive and interest groups may want to push listing practices in certain directions to further desired policies.  Generally, I expect that these forces will affect how other decision-makers act on policies and how they view certain groups that could possibly be added to the FTO list.  I will briefly discuss the interests that played a role in the case studies’ designations before considering in detail how interests might affect other groups’ listings.   
 
Boko Haram Boko Haram’s designation is an example of how internal interests can affect the listing process as a number of interests within the US weighed in on the decision.  Intelligence services and the Department of Justice urged listing as a means to prosecute members of the group (“State Department,” 2014).  The Department of Justice submitted a letter for State’s files declaring that Boko Haram met all legal requirements for FTO designation (Hosenball and Shiffman, 2012).  In addition, a number of think tanks released reports urging designation during the Department of State review (Roach, 2012).   A Change.org petition collected signatures from members of the public urging the Department of State to list Boko Haram (Change.org, 2012).   
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A number of actors counterbalanced listing interests.  Perhaps most importantly, the Nigerian government strongly opposed listing Boko Haram, claiming that designation would legitimize the group and entrench the militants in Nigerian society while hindering aid to citizens affected by the group’s actions (Kessler, 2014).  Over 20 American academic experts in African and Nigerian politics signed a letter addressed to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton urging her not to designate the group and stating that “…an FTO designation…would limit American policy options to those least likely to work, and would undermine domestic political conditions necessary in Nigeria for an enduring solution.” (Hirsh, 2014).   A number of think tanks also suggested that designating Boko Haram would hinder the overall counterterrorism objectives of the United States (Leung, 2014).    While the Counterterrorism Bureau might have been leaning towards designation in 2012, other interested parties within the government opposed taking that step.  The Africa Bureau in the Department of State did not support designation (Kessler, 2014).  The Department of Defense expressed concern over Nigeria’s human rights record and suggested that listing would legitimize the brutal tactics that the Nigerian government was already using against supposed Boko Haram fighters (Friend, 2014).  Additionally, listing Boko Haram conflicted with the Obama administration’s goals of deemphasizing al-Qaeda’s influence on the rise of African Islamic extremism.  The administration aimed to keep the focus on the war on terror narrowly focused on defeating al-Qaeda.  By leaving Boko Haram off the FTO list, leaders within the Obama administration believed that the war on terror in Africa could be kept from becoming unnecessarily broad (Hirsh, 2014).   
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Real Irish Republican Army The FTO designation of Irish groups is symbolically important for US-British relations (Cronin, 2011).  Failure to list Irish causes as terrorists triggered anger within British circles, as the US seemed to be legitimizing violence within its ally’s borders (Shane, 2011).  While the Department of State debated RIRA’s inclusion, the British embassy encouraged designation in a November 2000 public statement saying that designation would make “additional legal powers available to law enforcement in dealing with [RIRA]”(CBS News, 2001).   Cooperation between the US and UK is very important for America’s diplomatic goals, and indecision about Irish violence was seen as damaging that collaboration (Shane, 2011).  In addition, some within the Justice Department advocated for listing as a better means to counter various supporters of the group operating in the United States (Breinholt, 2015). On the other hand, the United States is home to the largest Irish diaspora in the world.  Irish groups have enjoyed support from Americans with Irish heritage, making listing politically tricky for many elected officials (BBC News, 2001).  A number of decision makers stressed that Irish independence activities were fundamentally different from terrorist activities because Irish groups tended to try to minimize casualties and targeted government actors rather than civilians.  Congressional hearings on the IRA, RIRA and CIRA have focused on the groups’ links to narcotics trafficking rather than on their violent tactics (Colombia, 1999; The Patten Commission, 1999). 
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 In addition, the consequences attached to listing an Irish group could imply sanctions on US citizens who supported Irish independence from Great Britain (Cronin, 2011).  Support for IRA activities often came through donations to the IRA’s American fundraising arm, the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID).  NORAID raised around $6 million from prominent Irish-Americans, including Congressman Peter King (R-NY).  NORAID’s ties to the IRA and its offshoots, RIRA and CIRA, meant that many citizens could be prosecuted under the material support clause (Murphy, 2011).  The volume of citizens that could potentially be caught up by a material support clause prosecution made listing unappealing.    
Speaking about Terror Threats in Congressional Hearings From the Boko Haram and RIRA cases, we see that interest groups will attempt to shape the designation process.  One of the ways that groups outside of the bureaucracy attempted to affect the listing of Boko Haram and RIRA was through public pronouncements about the groups.  We may expect many actors will attempt to influence language about terrorism in order to focus interest on certain groups and policies. Therefore, we may view variation in linguistic choices about terrorism and terror threat between groups as a sign of political bargaining over the terrorist watch list.   As discussed in the introduction’s treatment of the U.S. watch lists, a number of different actors and agencies have input in the designation process.  Choices made in foreign affairs have domestic effects in enhancing certain policies and constituencies at the expense of others (McCormick, 2012).  Interest groups have a role in affecting the preferences of those examining the list because policies such as 
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those that govern designating terrorist groups create incentives for interest group activity in those areas.  Interest groups will want to affect the calculations of those who will make decisions about inclusion or removal of groups.  Even if listing decisions ultimately come from the State Department and individuals there are the driving force in initiating the listing process, others continually seek to have input.  Mr. Blazakis states: “Perhaps more that 80% of all the designations we do in our office are prompted by the folks who [work in the Counterterrorism Bureau], who are reading the information on a day-to-day basis, but there are situations where another agency or department will ask us to designate a group or a foreign government may ask us to designate an organization.  So really, thinking about it, why we designate a group or the genesis of the idea comes from three places: internal to this office, foreign partners, and other US government agencies. “   The participation of other government agencies and foreign partners in listing both Boko Haram and RIRA suggest that the list is viewed as an important tool in a number of counterterrorism policy areas.  Listing is not just a rote process from workers in the Counterterrorism Bureau.  There is continuous dialogue with actors that see the FTO list as important for their policy objectives, and these actors are not limited to US agents.   Foreign government as well as other bureaucratic agencies can press for listing groups that affect their interests.  The interest of others in designation suggests that the FTO process can confer legitimacy on policy implementation choices.  Both Mr. Blazakis and Mr. Breinholt suggest that the FTO plays an important role in the overall counterterror missions of the Department of State and Department of Justice, respectively.  They point to the idea that the FTO list is a means of agenda setting for the government’s overall counterterrorism goals, and 
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we can expect that other groups may also want a say in that agenda.  For the State Department, the FTO list can act as a talking point between states seeking to cooperate to reduce counterterror threat.  Mr. Blazakis states: “We always think whether or not we can actually get other governments to do something comparable to [our designation], because they do have their own UN or other international obligations to fulfill. We try to leverage the designation of other countries, so they can actually take action against a group as well because of the US designation.”   The FTO designation acts to emphasize the groups that the United States views as dangerous for its overall foreign policy objectives.  While the legal consequences of the list do not reach beyond US jurisdictions, the presence of the designation can affect the actions of other states by invoking the need for international cooperation in this issue area.  Building consensus over those groups then continues past internal designation decisions to include other actors.  Discourse surrounding violent groups is both part of this consensus-building and the point in the policy-making process in which actors outside the bureaucracy may have the most say.  Public pronouncements about terrorist watch lists allow a variety of speakers with different interests an opportunity to push the FTO list towards their interests.  Speakers are able to use language to convey differences in views about groups.  In order to examine discourse surrounding terrorism policy, I use Congressional hearing records from 1997 to 2012.  A total of 351 hearings in 14 Senate committees and 18 House committees publicly discussed terrorism policy over this time period.  Examining these conversations about terrorism and threat helps to contextualize the debate surrounding the terrorist watch list and further 
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explains how actors outside the Department of State seek to exert influence over final listing decisions.   
 
Latent Text Analysis There are a number of different methods available to analyze text.  Basic latent text analysis looks for patterns in linguistic expressions that indicate how certain expressions are used together.   In order to know what topics matter to which decision-makers within the context of listing choice, I first want to know what topics seem to feature prominently in discussions about terrorism within the US government.   One of the most basic models follows Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003) to create a probabilistic text model called latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to detect topics underlying the discussion of terrorism with Congressional hearings.  In LDA, documents are processed as random mixtures of unknown topics.  The topics are made up of distributions over the words present in the corpus of documents.  LDA tests the likelihood that the words used to discuss a topic are related over a body of texts.  This Bayesian method allows for examination language choice over a set of related documents.  This model has been extended over time to pick up more nuanced findings available in texts (Blei and Lafferty, 2007; Blei and McAuliffe, 2007; Grimmer, 2010).    Jumping off Grimmer’s (2010) expressed agenda model, I look at the relative priorities different actors give to aspects of counterterrorism policy.  Grimmer’s expressed agenda model is meant to capture the weight that authors give to various topics.  I model how various government actors with interests in the terrorist watch lists express their priorities in the context of using listing in service of a policy 
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agenda.  Congressional hearings are a setting in which members of Congress, the executive office, and the bureaucracy can all be called to express views of counterterror policy on the record, and they therefore offer a meaningful way to examine discourse in this policy arena.    I expect that members of separate groups will have different priorities when discussing counterterrorism policy, and these differences suggest distinct visions of the role of the FTO list.  Individuals will attempt to shape discourse surrounding terrorist groups and policy in ways that highlight their concerns and policy goals at the expense of other possible avenues of discussion.  In order to assess how group members differ in their discourse in Congressional hearings, I divided speakers into six categories: Democrats, Republicans, bureaucrats, lobbyists, members of the military, and experts.  Speakers elected to public office were grouped according to their party affiliation.  Speakers who identified themselves as working for a branch of the US government were categorized as bureaucrats.  This group includes both career bureaucrats and political appointments.  Any speaker working in a branch of the US military at the time of the hearing was categorized as a member of the military.       The categories of lobbyists and experts required more subjective determinations.  Any person speaking on behalf of an interest group, business interest or union was considered a lobbyist.  The “lobbyist” categorization is meant to encompass any speaker with vested interests in policy outcomes that may help or harm the goals of the organization that they represent.  A speaker was considered an “expert” if they claimed to have been brought to speak in order to provide 
 72 
information on the topic of the hearing.  Experts include speakers employed at think tanks, university professors, and public officials not in the US federal bureaucracy.  Table 2.1 shows the total number of speakers in each group, including the break down by sex and the number of observations in each group by presidential administration in the dataset.  Since speakers may talk at multiple hearings, there are more observations than number of speakers.  Table 2.1 also reports the breakdown of Democrat and Republican speakers in the House and Senate.    Table 2.1: Characteristics of Groups  N Male/Female Clinton/Bush/Obama House/Senate 
Democrats 233 178/55 59/783/197 169/62 
Republicans 255 235/20 77/768/194 186/64 
Bureaucrats 444 356/88 97/489/119  
Lobbyists 267 229/38 11/281/39  
Military 46 45/1 9/38/13  
Experts 381 308/72 42/403/96  
N 1626 1351/274 295/2762/658 355/126    Latent text analysis helps illuminate differences in topics covered by each group of speakers.  The LDA model presents the most common topics in a corpus of texts, by showing sets of words that are commonly correlated throughout the set of documents.  As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, I expect that speakers will vary in the topics they focus on due to differences in interests.  The subsequent differences in discourse suggest that speakers may have differing opinion about what groups constitute a terror threat that deserves FTO recognition.   Due to contrasting policy preferences, Democrats and Republicans may focus on different topics relating to terrorism.  Additionally, individual constituency 
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interests may change the relative importance of certain topics for elected officials.  We may expect that certain security topics may matter more to one party’s members than the other.  For example, Republicans may wish to focus discourse on security threats and America’s need to protect interests abroad.  On the other hand, Democrats could be more concerned with the ramifications of policy on civil liberties.  Members of both parties may be more complementary of policies enacted when a member of their own party is in the White House.     I expect that bureaucrats, lobbyists and military personnel will also be interested in advocating for their policy interests.  Bureaucrats may wish to consolidate decision-making power within their ranks by focusing on their procedural authority.  As shown in the interviews conducted in this chapter, bureaucrats may push to pursue certain policies so agencies’ counterterror goals can be best realized.  These goals may extend to listing certain groups that can be best pursued through legal means.  Lobbyists will also seek to present threats and possible policy outcomes in a way that pushes their political interests.  They may push for focus on certain violent groups as more pressing threats when those groups affect lobbyists’ interests due to a groups’ location, targets or overall goals.  Military personnel may wish to defend military actions and so will discuss those groups that military leaders deems to be the greatest threats to US action.  They may be more focused on military action as the best course of policy rather than diplomatic or domestic counterterror intervention.  Experts are included as a kind of control category.  Experts should be interested in presenting the facts of the topic 
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they are discussing rather than shaping their discourse to match overarching policy interests.    
Topics The LDA text analysis examines word stems, which means all words that start with the same base are considered together.  For example, the “secur-“ stem would include “secure,” “secured,” “security,” and so on.  The topic groupings collect stems that appear frequently together and weight topics by frequency of appearance in the corpus.  By comparing the most prominent topics discussed by each group, we can examine whether ideas about terror and counterterrorism coalesce differently depending on the interests of the group.  Understanding how speakers diverge in their overall concerns can then help to explain why counterterror policy focuses on some violent groups rather than others.  Speakers in a public forum such as these Congressional hearings can shape discourse that surrounds policy, and the dominant discourse can then shape future specific policy actions, including listing decisions.  Table 2.2 displays the top five most prominent topics by subgroup.  Topics six through 10 are displayed in the Appendix.  A number of observations can be made about each groups’ most common topics.  Democrats’ concerns seem mainly procedural and bureaucratic.  Common topic stems for Democrats include “committ-“, “senat’”, “agenc-“, “state” and “administr-,“ which all link to discussions about policy decisions happening in government.  In addition, the use of topic terms such as “work”, “govern” and “system” suggest preoccupation with implementation of policy.  While Republican  
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Table 2.2: Top Five Topics by Group 
Democrats Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 list  terror-  year  countri- today american work govern- back health 
 
secur- time work year nation terror- committ inform- senat- report- 
 
state year know secur- peopl- terrorist inform- effort agenc- believ- 
 
state know terror countri- committ govern- work need terrorist act 
 
time need terrorist secur- countri- respon- system year right administr-  
 
Republicans Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 think secur- need terrorist terror nation attack  program use inform- 
 
state secur- nation time threat attack respon- countri- senat- govern 
 
think time secur- terrorist attack people- terror- issu- intellig- way 
 
secur- state threat first senate unit import- act right general 
 
list terrorist need think import attack law issu- program protect  
 
 
Bureaucrats Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 program provid- work terrorist year system use includ- inform- depart- 
 
develop unit secur- feder- think agenc- state work activ- program 
 
develop- think- countri- terrorist secur- oper- state nation work inform- 
 
state provid- feder- nation secur- inform- system need financ- charact- 
 








Lobbyists Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 industri- use  terror- state govern- feder- busi- health peopl- member- 
 
insur- govern- secur- work provid- time terrorist year health system 
 
insur- provid- time nation state member busi- must american septemb- 
 
secur- terror use need organ- peopl- health industri- public govern- 
 




Military Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 train oper- state nation year coordin- marin- guard forc- respon- 
 
secur- state work new effort continu- first nation depart mission 
 
secur- train nation state unit oper- need guard militari- think 
 
unit support secur- use provid- forc- new year need effort 
 





Experts Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5 state terrorist secur- need govern- attack inform- system includ- time 
 
secur- state need terrorist attack charact- includ- govern- unit countri- 
 
work think new public attack unit use govern- inform- may 
 
use commun- think  terrorist nation charact- new govern- unit group 
 
state public secur- terror- year law need charact- nation includ- 
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topics also heavily feature some of the same procedural terms, Republicans show more interest in discussion of threat.  “Attack”, “threat”, and “secur-“ all appear in multiple common topics for Republicans.  Moreover, Republican topics tend to touch on a number of legal terms, including in topics terms such as “act”, “right”, and “law.”  These terms could suggest a slightly different goal for counterterror policy implementation than seen in Democratic topics.  Interestingly, Republicans and Democrats are the only speakers for which “list” is a common topic term.  Watch lists and listing practices may have more significance for speakers that interact more directly with the public.    Bureaucrats’ topic distribution indicates that actors from governmental agencies brought to speak in front of Congress tend to stick to topics related to operational and bureaucratic procedure.  These topics probably reflect both the bureaucrat’s policy interest and the nature of questions that bureaucrats tend to be asked.  Common topic terms include “program”, “work”, “system,” “offic-“ and “agenc-.“ Not surprisingly, members of the military who speak at Congressional hearings often use terms related to military procedure.  Military topics include terms such as “guard”, “train”, “oper-“ and “mission.”   When lobbyists speak about terrorism topics in front of Congress, they often bring up topics related to business interests, especially insurance interests.  Common terms such as “insur-“, “busi-“, “compani-“ and “risk” suggest that counterterror interests can intersect with lobbyists’ interests that may shape how policy is implemented.  Experts who testify before Congress show a decidedly mixed 
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topic selection, drawing on terms used by almost every other group examined here.  Some of the most common terms used by experts are “inform-“ and “includ-.”     While each groups’ topic distributions are fairly vague, they do point to some differences in in overall discourse between interested parties.  In fact, the variation in topic terms and common topics may seem somewhat predictable, as each group discusses topics that seem related to their policy interests. The topic distributions indicate that these real differences in interest affect even general discourse about terrorism and counterterrorism.     In addition to giving common topics, LDA analysis can also present correlations between terms.  Table 2.3A and 2.3B shows correlation coefficients of terms commonly used in discussions of the term “terror” and “watchlist.”  Additionally, correlation coefficients for terms associated with “terrorist,” “secur-“ and “intellig-“ are presented in the Appendix.    Table 2.3A shows that insurance concerns seem to dominate correlations for Democrats, bureaucrats, and lobbyists.  Stems such as “incur-“, “ “loss”, “market”, and “reinsur-“ are highly correlated with the term “terror.”  The term “tria,” the acronym for the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act first approved in 2002, is also correlated with “terror” for Democrats and bureaucrats.  Republican correlations show a connection between “terror” and policy with highly correlated terms such as “polici-“, “order”, and “support.”  In addition, the Republican correlations show an interest in discussing terrorist groups with “organ-“, “intern-“ and “group” all appearing as common correlations.    
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Table 2.3A: “Terror” correlations by group 
Democrats  Republicans  Bureaucrats  Lobbyists  Military  Experts  terrorist 0.55 terrorist 0.73 terrorist 0.53 insur- 0.80 world 0.86 action 0.61 insur- 0.50 intern- 0.58 tria 0.49 coverag- 0.76 press 0.80 coalit- 0.56 loss 0.50 relat- 0.55 coverag- 0.48 policyhold- 0.74 free 0.79 attempt 0.50 market 0.50 organ- 0.54 policyhold 0.48 loss 0.71 terrorist 0.79 right 0.50 policyhold 0.46 polici- 0.54 polici 0.47 market 0.71 effort 0.75 israel 0.49 tria 0.45 state 0.54 reinsur- 0.45 commerci- 0.70 speech 0.75 citizen 0.48 govern- 0.44 order 0.53 insur- 0.44 risk 0.70 aim 0.74 stop 0.48 trigger 0.44 support 0.53 combat 0.41 stabil- 0.69 countri- 0.74 bomb 0.47 fact 0.43 depart 0.51 foreign 0.41 underwrit- 0.68 foreign 0.74 communism 0.46 reinsur- 0.43 group 0.50 market 0.41 certainti- 0.65 lie 0.74 osama 0.46  Table 2.3B: “Watchlist” correlations by group 
Democrats  Republicans  Bureaucrats  Lobbyists  Military  Experts attacksagainst 0.66 lawabid- 0.69 redress 0.74 defacto 0.77 qaida 0.99 fbi 0.83 federal 0.66 callous 0.61 misidentif- 0.73 expound 0.77 nongovernment- 0.98 obtain 0.78 gun 0.66 fragmentari 0.61 tsc 0.70 gun 0.77 depart- 0.95 individu- 0.77 leadership 0.66 can 0.56 nomin- 0.68 rebut- 0.77 humanitarian 0.95 placement 0.77 male 0.66 ubiquit- 0.46 complain 0.65 tipoff 0.77 assert 0.92 attorney 0.74 semiautomat- 0.66 screen 0.43 suspicion 0.55 unredact- 0.77 nctc 0.92 citizen 0.71 handgun 0.64 latent 0.42 encount- 0.54 unrestrict- 0.77 bipartisan 0.89 fake 0.71 nra 0.61 profil- 0.42 inconvenienc- 0.5 unsecur- 0.77 communal 0.89 match 0.70 suspect 0.61 troubleshoot 0.42 known 0.44 vict- 0.77 embodi- 0.89 suspicion 0.70 dealer 0.60 useabl- 0.42 database- 0.41 misidentif- 0.76 grievanc- 0.89 transact- 0.70 
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 Correlations related to the testimony of members of the military seem to show First Amendment interests.  “Press”, “free”, and “speech” are common correlations that relate terrorism issues to civil liberties concerns.  For experts, common correlations suggest that discussions of terror are topic-related.  The use of the term “terror” is correlated with terms that could cover many separate topics brought up in Congressional hearings, including “Osama”, “Israel”, “communism”, “right” and “bomb,” rather than pointing to an overall theme of discussion.    Table 2.3B presents common correlations for “watchlist.”  These correlations suggest that groups may have differing concerns when they speak about watch lists.  Democratic speakers show high correlations with terms related to guns, implying that they view the term as mostly related to gun control policy.  “Gun”, “make”, “semiautomat-“, “nra” and “dealer” are all commonly correlated.  Republican correlations instead seem to focus on issues related to potential screening of individuals with common correlations including terms such as “lawabid-“, “screen” and “profil-“.  Somewhat similarly, bureaucrats often discuss watch lists in terms related to issues of profiling and the potential misuse of lists.   “Redress”, “misidentifi-“, “complain”, and “inconvenienc-” all point to potential issues users of any watch list might face.    Correlations for members of the military do not suggest any one theme when it comes to discussing watch lists.  Instead, a number of different concerns appear with high correlations for terms such as “qaida”, “humanitarian,” and “grievance.” Common correlations for lobbyists suggest potential privacy concerns related to the use of watch lists.  “Unredact-“, “unrestrict-“, and “unsecur-“ all point to concerns 
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with who can have access to lists, while “misidentifi-“ and “vict-“ could imply unease over usage of the lists.   Experts appear to often discuss watch lists in terms of listing processes, with terms such as “fbi”, “obtain”, “placement”, and “match” having high correlations.    With these results, we see that groups differ in how they speak about terrorism related topics.  By using different language, groups can focus policy arguments in directions that favor their desired outcomes.  In the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA, the desired outcome varied between groups, with some arguing for listing while others preferred to deal with the violence from the groups through means other than the FTO list.  The relative weight of these arguments shifted over time, so that eventually the groups favoring listing won out.  Today, Boko Haram and RIRA are treated through the lens of counterterror operations.  We can expect that the interplay between linguistic choices of various interest groups affects all potentially listed organizations.   
 
Congressional Interests and Designation The previous section shows that language varies between different groups.  The LDA analysis suggests that these groups view the general topic of terrorism through a number of different angles.  Whereas members of Congress are focused on topics that may play to their constituencies, bureaucrats, the military, and experts are focused on different objectives when speaking about terror.  These variations in interest affect the overall listing process as personnel within the State Department weigh the benefits of formal designation.  By studying the factors affecting how members of Congress speak, this section seeks to demonstrate that the language of 
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terrorism is being used to express political concerns that have roots in domestic politics as much as in interests in homeland security.   The results of Chapter 1 suggested that interests of members of Congress could affect how they view terrorism threats.  The following section examines this hypothesis further.  Congressional interests – including donor, interest group, and district interests – may play a role in bringing up listing questions.  Members of Congress press for listing or delisting when their political interests make looking into listing processes politically viable.  Discussions of violent groups are likely to take place in committee, and legislators on foreign policy related committees are likely to have agenda setting and gatekeeping power in this area, along with information advantages over others (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987).  Legislators will be more interested in debating the merits of including a group on the FTO list when they face constituent or interest group pressure.  Interest group pressure is likely to be focused on committee-stage decisions, and will affect how likely it is that a legislator is responsive to and interested in the listing issue for a given group.  The more organized interest groups there are in a given issue area, the more incentivized Congress is likely to be to look at policy affecting those groups (Hall and Wayman, 1990).   The political process that plays out in Congress reflects bargaining between the parts of government over control over the listing process.  Who gets listed reflects a combination of actor preferences through the bargaining process. Domestic politics has been shown to play a role in legislative preferences over other foreign policy areas such as trade and aid.   Since international policy choice will 
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have domestic political consequences, leaders will look to their constituencies when choosing international policy.  Differing characteristics of constituencies will affect what policy outcomes are supported (Tingley 2009; Milner and Tingley, 2010; Milner and Tingley 2011).  Milner and Tingley (2011) assert that legislators’ reelection goals mean they will wish to avoid negative policy outcomes for their constituencies, even in areas where they are thought to have little concern.  Even assuming legislators are more likely to follow Presidential cues in national security policy, domestic concerns should play a role in patterns of support for listing.   Congress is likely to get involved when committee members’ constituencies demand action (Moe and Howell, 1999).  When those desires are in conflict with the interests of the bureaucracy and the executive, all decision-makers will bargain for leverage to make listing decisions.  Members of Congress should intervene when listing is tied to the interests of donors and interest groups.  Congress members on relevant foreign policy committees are more likely to have relevant interest groups to whom they have to be responsive.  Those on the committees are better able to set the agenda about which groups are discussed.  Below, I discuss the actions of members of Congress involved in the two case studies before turning to the more general effects of Congressional.   
Boko Haram A number of Republicans in Congress urged designation of Boko Haram during the first review by the Department of State, including Representative Patrick Meehan (R-PA), who introduced an amendment to a defense bill meant to force the State Department to designate (Hosenball and Shiffman, 2012).  After initial review 
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resulted in listing of individuals rather than the group, Representative Meehan and Representative Peter King (R-NY) released a joint statement decrying the failure to list and stating that the State Department “…must take the growing threat seriously” (Quinn, 2012).  Additionally, Mr. Breinholt observes that Congress expressed its frustration with Boko Haram’s status to the Justice Department:  “There have been at least a couple of occasions where Congress has passed either a resolution or a statute insisting that the Secretary of State designate a group that hasn’t been designated before.  On occasion, there are nominations from other sources… Congress very much wanted to see [Boko Haram] designated.  [There was] frustration on the Hill about how responsive the State Department was to Congressional suggestions.”3  Once the group was listed, the designation continued to have political consequences. The delay came under scrutiny following the group’s abduction of schoolgirls in 2014, with numerous outlets questioning the State Department’s 2012 decision (Bier, 2014; Rogin, 2014).  In addition, the designation became part of the ongoing controversy surrounding Secretary of State Clinton’s time in the State Department with Senator David Vitter (R-LA) seeking to make the Boko Haram decision part of the inquiry into Clinton’s e-mail scandal (Office of Senator David Vitter, 2014; Alpert, 2015).  Clinton’s candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President has made the FTO designation into a campaign talking-point for those 
                                                        3 In recent years, a number of resolutions have been introduced to Congress urging designation of groups, including the Qods Forces in Iran (H.R.854-113th Congress) and the Muslim Brotherhood (H.R.5194-113th Congress).  Many other resolutions relating to the status of governments on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list have been introduced, including resolutions for inclusion of Venezuela (H.R.1049-110th Congress) and the Palestinian Authority (H.R.622-113th Congress), and resolutions against removal of North Korea and Libya (Rennack, 2015).  As far as I can tell, no designation resolutions have made it out of committee.  However, the interest of members of Congress in introducing these types of resolutions supports the claim that these elite actors seek involvement in the designation process.   
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wishing to question Clinton’s foreign policy record, demonstrating that the choice to designate itself has political consequences.    
Real Irish Republican Army A number of politicians have publicly supported Irish independence causes and advocated for viewing the IRA separately from the War on Terror.  Congressman Peter King (R-NY) held pro-IRA rallies in the 1980s, saying, “We must pledge ourselves to those brave men and women who this very moment are carrying forth the struggle against British imperialism in the streets of Belfast and Derry.” (Shane, 2011).  King publicly denounced a 2002 Congressional hearing into possible illegal activities by the group (Massie, 2010).    Once the IRA signed on to the GFA, decision-makers also declared that their pledge of nonviolence warranted immediate reduction of State Department scrutiny.  Congressman Darrell Issa (R-CA) lobbied Congress to provide logistical support to IRA and Sinn Fein officials trying to have the group removed from State Department oversight (Reviewing, 2005).  In 2005, Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA) stated that the IRA had been removed from the terrorist list because “…it does not make one a terrorist just to be an insurgent.  George Washington was a violent insurgent.  But a terrorist is one who targets noncombatants.” (U.S. Counterterrorism, 2005).  
Regression Analysis  The cases of Boko Haram and RIRA indicate that members of Congress do see value in commenting on the listing status of groups.  In addition, the cases imply that domestic political concerns beyond terrorism preparedness matter to speakers when discussing groups.  Depending on other interests, members of Congress may advocate for or against listing. This section looks further into whether the types of 
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discussions seen in the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA reflect general patterns of linguistic choices between members of Congress.  While the LDA is helpful for studying what actors say when discussing terms related to terrorism, the hearing data may also help explain why speakers make the linguistic choices that they do.  With information on the variation in linguistic choices, I can assess factors that influence word choice for Democrats and Republicans to see if the differences seen in the LDA analysis are indicative of significant linguistic differences between the parties.    I use the sample of Democratic and Republican speakers to further investigate questions about variations in discourse in terrorism hearings.  Do linguistic choices by Democrats and Republicans differ in predictable ways?  Are there characteristics of speakers that make using certain terms more or less likely?  In order to examine these questions, Table 2.4 and 2.5 show results from two models predicting Democratic and Republican speakers’ use of the five words and stems discussed above: “terror”, “terrorist”, “watchlist”, “secur-“ and “intellig-“.  These models examine whether or not discussions of terms related to terrorism and counterterrorism differ between members of Congress.  All Democratic and Republican speakers are included in the analyzed sample.  Table 2.4 shows results from a generalized least squares (GLS) regression with random effects for each speaker analyzing the frequency of use of each word or stem in every instance in which an speaker participates in a hearing.  The random effects are meant to account for potential variations in loquaciousness of the speaker and individual verbal quirks.   That is, some speakers may be more likely than others to 
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use terms overall, and by controlling for their differences I can better examine the effects of group characteristics on term usage.  Table 2.5 shows results of logistic regression with random effect for each speaker analyzing whether a speaker uses those words or stems in appearances at hearings at all.    
Dependent Variables For each term, two variables were constructed.  First, I created a count variable that codes how many times each individual speaker employs a given term in a single hearing.  Speakers can have multiple entries if they made pronouncements in more than one hearing over time.  Second, I created a dichotomous variable which notes whether or not a speaker uttered a term at all in a hearing in which that individual participated.    A number of covariates were included in the models to capture possible factors affecting word choice by participants in Congressional hearings related to terrorism topics.      
Party Affiliation A dichotomous variable is included in the models to represent speakers’ party affiliation.  Republicans are coded as 1, while Democrats are coded as 0.  All independent candidates are coded with the party with which they caucus.    
Legislative Body In this dichotomous variable, members of the Senate are coded as 1, while members of the House of Representatives are coded as 0.   
Sex Male speakers are coded as 1, while female speakers are coded as 0.   
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Political Environment The political environment of any given hearing could affect what is said.  Republicans and Democrats may be more likely to emphasize certain issues relating to terrorism depending on the relative positions of the parties.  I model a number of variables to account for different political situations.  First, the foreign policy goals of the administration in power may affect which topics relating to counterterrorism are up for discussion.  An ordinal variable indicating what administration was in power at the time of the hearing is included, indicating whether the discussion took place during the Clinton, Bush, or Obama administrations.  I have also specified variables accounting for a speaker being a member of the party that is concurrently the majority party in the House, whether or not a speaker is a member of the sitting President’s party, and a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not there is divided government.  Additionally, I created an interaction term indicating whether or not a speaker’s party matches the president’s in times of divided government.  In this chapter, I only examine a model that includes the variables indicating the administration, whether speakers match with the President’s party, the dichotomous divided government variable, and the interaction term.  Other specifications are available in the Appendix with “terror” frequencies as the dependent variable.   
Percent of Federal Spending in Home State Going toward Defense Democratic and Republican speakers may be influenced by the needs of their home constituencies.  To capture constituency interest in counterterrorism policy, I include the percentage of federal spending in a state earmarked for defense, as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United States printed by the US Census 
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Bureau until 2011 and by ProQuest thereafter.  Not all years of the Statistical 
Abstract include state-by-state spending information.  Those years that are missing (1999, 2005, 2011, 2012) were imputed using growth rates extrapolated from proceeding years.    Table 2.4: GLS Regressions with Random Effects  Terror Terrorist Watchlist Secur- Intellig- 
Party Affiliation 2.71*** (0.820) 1.71*** (0.442) 0.075 (0.173) 0.454 (0.578) 0.608** (0.290) 
Legislative Body 3.23*** (0.737) 1.91*** (0.397) 0.128 (0.155) 0.033 (0.543) 0.989*** (0.261) 
Sex 0.462 (0.977) -0.174 (0.526) -0.027 (0.205) -0.248 (0.712) -0.253 (0.346) 
Administration -2.71*** (0.710) -0.756** (0.383) 0.116 (0.149) 1.29*** (0.449) 0.288 (0.251) 
Matches President’s 
Party 
2.57** (1.18) 1.38** (0.635) -0.018 (0.248) 2.17 (0.727) 0.378 (0.417) 
Divided Government -1.86* (0.986) -0.380 (0.531) 0.176 (0.207) -0.529 (0.607) 0.308 (0.349) 
Interaction (Party 
Match * Divided 
Government) 
-5.74*** (1.41) -2.53*** (0.760) -0.376 (0.297) -3.26*** (0.866) -0.982** (0.499) 
Federal Spending 8.50* (4.38) 4.50** (2.36) 1.46 (0.922) 2.84 (3.12) 3.11** (1.55) 
Constant 11.1*** (1.91) 3.79*** (1.03) 0.669* (0.401) 0.593 (1.25) -0.073 (0.675) 
N 1937 1937 1937 1937 1937 *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  Table 2.4 presents results of the GLS regression with term frequencies as the dependent variable.  The results suggest that certain characteristics of speakers and the political environment affect the frequency of term use when members of Congress talk about terrorism topics and policy in a public forum.  A Republican speaker is statistically likely to use the terms “terror” and “terrorism” more than a Democratic speaker.  Being a senator also increases the use of these terms.  Speaking in later administrations reduces the frequency of use of the “terror” and 
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“terrorism,” while reducing the discussion of terms related to “secur.”   This finding suggests that interest in watch listing practices might have increased during the Obama administration, even as overall discussion of terrorism policy has sometimes been pushed to the backburner by domestic concerns.   A number of political environment variables show significant effects on term use regarding “terror” and “terrorism.”  While matching the party of the executive branch increases use of “terror” and “terrorism,” being in the minority party in the legislative branch during divided government reduces the likelihood of discussion for every term.  In this dataset, divided government is a feature of all of the Clinton administration hearings and a portion of the Obama administration (2011-2012), while only a few years of the Bush administration were affected (2007-2009).  Increasing the power of the party not in the White House seems to suppress speakers’ willingness to discuss terrorism.  Yet the effects of divided government here fall on Democratic administrations, suggesting that perhaps the Obama and Clinton foreign policy differed substantially from Bush’s post-9/11 policy that heavily focused on counterterror.  Overall, the results show that political variables do affect speakers’ motivations to discussion certain terms in committee hearings.    The overall largest effects on the frequency of use are seen in the measurement of the percentage of defense spending in a speaker’s home state.  A percentage increase in the amount of federal spending in the state marked for defense is associated with using the term “terror” over eight more times, the term “terrorist” over four more times, and the term “secur” almost three more times.  These results suggest that constituency interests play a role in how often a politician 
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Obama administration, the only period of his administration in which Democrats controlled the legislature.  These results again suggest that Democrats may be less interested in talking about terrorism overall, as we see dips in “terror” use at times when they control the hearing schedule.  The figure also shows the overall reduction in discourse over time, as the predicted values for both parties fall from highs during the Clinton administration through the subsequent administrations.  Beyond knowing how certain characteristics affect the frequency of use, it may be helpful to know if these factors affect the incidence of use of these terms at all.   Results from the logistic regressions in Table 2.5 show how characteristics of speakers affect whether or not they employ a term at all in their testimony.    Table 2.5: Logistic Regressions with Random Effects  Terror Terrorist Watchlist Secur- Intellig- 
Party Affiliation 0.118 (0.180) 0.211 (0.164) 0.213 (0.153) 0.000 (0.149) 0.198 (0.161) 
Legislative Body 0.543*** (0.180) 0.396** (0.158) 0.220 (0.144) 0.059 (0.141) 0.591*** (0.148) 
Sex 0.157 (0.224) 0.205 (0.204) 0.050 (0.191) 0.035 (0.184) -0.065 (0.201) 
Administration -0.353*** (0.136) -0.207* (0.121) -0.019 (0.116) 0.270** (0.114) 0.128 (0.123) 
Matches President’s 
Party 
-0.325 (0.213) -0.365* (0.193) -0.122 (0.183) -0.260 (0.190) 0.235 (0.191) 
Divided 
Government 
0.113 (0.182) 0.017 (0.160 -0.014 (0.153) 0.480*** (0.156) -0.032 (0.162) 
Interaction (Party 
Match * Divided 
Government) 
-0.032 (0.255) -0.073 (0.227) -0.493** (0.221) -0.081 (0.221) -0.713*** (0.231) 
Federal Spending 0.056 (0.986) -1.16 (0.889) 0.862 (0.815) 1.37* (0.812) 1.11* (0.852) 
Constant 1.69*** (0.390) 0.703** (.345) -0.842** (0.328) -0.566* (0.321) -1.62*** (0.354) 
N 1937 1937 1937 1937 1937 *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  The effects found in the GLS regression are generally reflected in the logitistic results.  While neither Democrats nor Republicans are statistically more likely to use 
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any given term, Senators are more likely to utilize the terms “terror”, “terrorist”, and “intellig-“.  Speakers during later administrations are less likely to engage with the terms “terror” and “terrorism,” and more interested in topics related to the term “secur-“.  Party affiliation does not have significant effects on utilizing terms overall.  Notably, being in the minority party in legislature reduces discussion of topic related to “watchlist” and “intellig-“, suggesting that the party controlling hearing schedules may be less concerned with topics relating to oversight.  The level of federal spending on defense within a state affects the likelihood of discussing topics related to the terms “secur-“ and “intellig-“, with higher levels of spending associated with an increased likelihood of using those terms.    Overall, the results of this section are consistent with my contention that variation in actors’ interests will affect terrorism discourse and with the process seen in the cases of Boko Haram and RIRA discussed throughout the chapter.   Groups of actors differ in the topics and terms they focus on in their discussion of terrorism.  The regression results presented above suggest that individual and constituency concerns can affect the composition of interests and discourse.  Taken together, the findings of this chapter indicate that counterterrorism policy is subject to bargaining concerns similar to other policy processes.  As these actors advocate for their policy interests, whoever can push discourse towards their interests will have a means to affect counterterror policy choices in a way that favors their preferred policy outcomes.   
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Conclusion  This chapter has explored the dynamics of the listing process within the US government.  By tracing the listing process of Boko Haram and RIRA through interviews, textual analysis, and regression analysis, I show that designation is a consensus-building project driven by a number of sometimes competing interests.  Bureaucrats, members of Congress, and others have stakes in the decision to list a group as a terrorist organization.  The results suggest that violent groups can be treated differently depending on the interests of a variety of actors.  Outcomes can vary even within the State Department if regional equities favor listing for some groups and not others.  Listing is an essentially political practice in which different interests from different actors can come to bear.   Because the FTO list is meaningful for policy makers, we can expect that it has a real relation to enacted counterterror policy.  Surprisingly, the list’s greatest effects may be in opening up domestic counterterror actions.  Listing enables the Departments of Justice and Treasury to pursue actions against individuals who are tied to the listed groups.  The state can connect individuals to legal consequences most effectively through the FTO list.  The legal backing of the list allows for the pursuit of counterterror policy in a way that is justifiable to American and international publics.  The legalistic process of designation is important for presenting counterterror policies as systematic and thorough, even as interests can shape designation choices.    In addition to the value of adding a legal definition of terrorism to government actions, this chapter has explored the role of language in shaping our overall understanding of terror and threat.  Actors shape their language about 
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terrorism in relation to their overall policy interests, meaning that different actors make different linguistic choices.  The US has devised a system in which the definitional base behind counterterror is so flexible that the actions of any group can be presented in a way that does or does not fit the definition.  Therefore, the FTO designation marks the point at which definitional questions get cut off in favor of questions over appropriate action.  Interested parties know that listed and unlisted groups are subject to different sets of policy actions from that point forward.   This chapter explores the means by which listing can come about. Designation has specific policy implications, and linguistic choices affect how policy options are perceived.  The interests of elites with a real say in the policy process can impact how groups are discussed and therefore what groups will be the focus of US counterterror policy.  Those linked to listed groups are subject to a number of US legal statutes that limit communication, movement, and finances.  The next chapter will focus on how interests of the United States influence how groups are perceived in the media.  I argue that designation has additional consequences outside its legal ramifications.  Even after designation, linguistic choices continue to be made when talking about groups, and these choices mediate public understanding of group behavior.  I will examine the effect of state interests and designation choice on language by scrutinizing how designated FTOs are treated in public discourse through the media.  The interplay between language and interests is not limited to discourse in Congress, but seeps out into other messages consumed by the public.    
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CHAPTER 3 
What Are the Effects of Listing on Public Discussion of Groups? 
 How does elite discussion of violent groups impact public consumption of information about terrorist groups?  Previous chapters of this dissertation have shown that state-level interests play a role in the designation process, and elites within the state have incentives to bargain over designation choices.  This final chapter compares results across a number of groups, and shows how variations in designation status and state interest level are reflected in the language chosen to describe group members and group actions in the United States.  The results suggest that elite choices have effects on treatment of actors in the media even in countries with a free press.  State pronouncements affect how information is presented and perceived.  The elite-level choices filter down to public-level understanding of group behavior.  Looking at newspaper coverage of terrorist groups is important because media coverage of groups is how most people interact with the idea of the terrorist watch list.  Most people know about the terrorist list and government actions through news coverage of groups.  Knowing how news organizations react to state policy decisions and interests is necessary to understand the full impact of the terrorist watch list.   
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This chapter looks at how policy discussions are mediated in reports about groups and actions.  Differences in treatment based on elite interests affects how the media handles groups, and those differences in turn may affect what groups are able to do.  I look at the media coverage of six groups over time: the Taliban, Hezbollah, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Using coverage of these groups by the Associated Press and the New York Times, I compare how each is treated given their designation status over significant portions of the group’s lifespan and their relationship to US foreign policy interests over the same time period.  For each group, I argue that changes in the relationship between group activities and US foreign policy is reflected in elite pronouncements about the group, and in how the group is described by the press.  By tracing the treatment of the organization over time, I am able to account for changes in behavior and relative status of the group in relation to both its stated aims and its relevance to US foreign policy.     
Terrorism Discourse and the Media How terrorism is conceptualized through discourse may have a number of potential policy implications for elites and the public.  Discourse from elites that is provided to the public by the media gives information that contextualizes political actions.  Domestic audiences use this information to form opinions (Altheide, 2007).  Kapitan and Schulte (2002) argue that current rhetoric about terrorism in the US shuts down meaningful discussions about causes and effects and instead works to create an “us versus them” narrative.  The current discourse by leaders and the 
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media emphasizes threat and opposition to government policies while not addressing questions of legitimacy, methods, and goals.  The label is dependent on judgments about the purpose of the perpetrating group and necessarily brings about negative connotations to any future discussions, suggesting that terrorist labeling is a means to discredit future action by a group.   Many authors have noted that the formation of the idea of terrorism allows leaders to push for certain policy choices.  Altheide (2007) finds that media discussions on terrorism present a fear-based narrative that characterizes terror as an assault on American culture.  The fear induced from these portrayals leaves citizens more open to a variety of incursions into their everyday lives through acceptance of increased surveillance and inconveniences in the name of safety.  Perceptions that the country is in a state of threat allows for leaders to push for changes in policies that affect privacy laws, military budgets, and due process concerns.  Jackson (2007) posits that language helps shape social identities and social actions.  Manipulation of language can make certain policies more attractive to the public.  By pressing the threat of terrorism, policymakers can pressure for desired outcomes that might include regime change, expansion of military control of strategic resources, increased military presence in strategic regions and support for controversial regimes, increases in public surveillance, and reductions in civil liberties.  Linking the idea of terrorism to general feelings of threat and fear leads to calls for policies that can address those fears. By creating a “politics of fear” around the conception of terrorism, decision-makers can push for certain policies to be 
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implemented at the expense of others.  This use of discourse can lead to changes in criminal legislation, law enforcement powers, and foreign policy focus, among others (Altheide, 2006).    Terrorism discourse also relates to a number of other policy areas.  First, the act of labeling certain groups can tie terrorism to conceptions of identity for certain peoples and groups, affecting public treatment.  Much of state security policy in recent years has been shaped by concerns over terrorism in part because terrorism plays such a major role in current foreign policy narratives (Jackson, 2007).   The language used to describe foreign policy helps shape meanings, identities, and social understandings.  Relationships between certain groups are shaped through the system of signification in which labels can attach and then set the context in which interactions occur.  For example, discourse about terror affects how Muslim groups are viewed in way that can reinforce stereotypes and reframe cultural identities (Aly, 2007).  Labeling as terrorist has implications for any people associated with characteristics perceived as part of the designation.  Since part of the role of designation is to create an “other,” minority treatment and treatment of outgroups generally can suffer when connected to terrorist activities in popular discourse  (Crelinsten, 1998). Second, treatment of terrorism issues can change opinions on security policy and blur lines between appropriate domestic and international security mandates.  The terms terrorism and counterterrorism can be applied to different activities to support decision-makers interests.  Claiming a stake in counterterrorism allows agencies to assert roles that may not otherwise be possible.  Counterterrorism blurs 
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agency mandates by making many bureaus with otherwise distinct agendas compete over a subset of budgetary allowances.  Applying security interests to agencies covering drug trade, organized crime and immigration, for example, forces decision-makers to fight over resources (Crelinsten, 1998).    Third, interest in counterterrorism has refocused aid and development work as a tool of foreign policy for reducing the number of potential terrorists (Beall, et al, 2006).   Changes in policy due to counterterror concerns make certain kinds of states more attractive and likely to receive aid at the expense of other needy areas.   These kinds of decisions rest on assumptions about the nature of terrorism and its causes.  Fourth, as terrorism has entered into states’ foreign policy concerns, the actions that states take as counterterror policy impacts international legal doctrines.  States have claimed the “necessity” of counterterror intervention into other countries despite legal norms against such an incursion on sovereignty.  Johnstone (2004) argues that counterterror policy claims may be creating a category of “illegal, but excused” international actions that could undermine international legal frameworks.   Counterterror actions are often justified under more general human security interests rather than action for national interests.   These justifications allow states to pursue action against nonstate actors in states whose sovereignty should not otherwise allow such interventions.  Since powerful states may have more ability to shape discourse over terrorism, they may be able to improperly force other states to go against their international legal interests.  If this dynamic becomes set, norms of intervention can take shape. 
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 Finally, the implementation of counterterror policies that takes place after the label has been defined can backfire since dissidents can use their issues with such policies as justification for action (Jackson, 2007).  The rhetoric that surrounds discourse about terrorism may intensify effects of violence by heightening public fear surrounding the actions, implicitly endorsing retaliatory actions, entrenching dissidents because there is no room for negotiation over terms, or encouraging more violent action by groups to draw attention to causes, leading to more civilian casualties (Kapitan and Schulte, 2002).  This chapter looks at the possible consequences labeled groups face in terms of media coverage of their actions.  States have the power to name terrorist groups, and that label has normative consequences for how the public might respond to a group.  If terrorist watch lists are meaningful tools of foreign policy, then we might expect that the lists themselves have consequences for designated groups, and those effects might be seen through media coverage.  The media tend to report on foreign policy in ways that cue feelings of threat.  In addition, terrorism receives extended news coverage even relative to other threating topics (Nacos et al., 2007).  The consequences of this threatening coverage could be positive for the groups in terms of increased publicity and membership, while the state clearly hopes for negative consequences.  One possible negative effect for groups is decreased public support for the group, its cause, and its members.  Public support could be conceived as both support from domestic populations or possibly support from international audiences who may care about the group.  
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Gadarian (2010) argues that the emotional aspect of media stories about terrorism affects public opinion regarding foreign policy in this issue area.  In her Threat Model, the feelings of threat and fear that pervade media reports about terrorists make people more likely to support hawkish foreign policies to counter terrorism.  In this model, the media does more than report the policies of certain political leaders, but also influences the emotional space in which people digest meanings and form opinions.  The threatened emotional space in which people form opinions about terrorism implies that adding or removing a group from the terrorist watch list – and the media coverage that would surround such choices – can be an important cue for leaders to engage with in order to pursue certain policies.   Especially leaders interested in hawkish counterterror measures may stand to gain support through manipulation of the terrorist watch list and its use in the news.   The ‘terrorist’ label has strong negative connotations in many societies and we might expect that a group that is designated and discussed as such will experience a loss in public approval of its actions.  While it can be hard to measure public opinion on every group, it is possible to examine public discourse of a group through means such as news reports and elite statements.  As Herman and Chomsky (1988) note, newspapers tend to frame their stories to echo the dominant ideology and interests of their nation of origin.  This finding suggests that taking reporting on terrorism as a reflection of the state’s desire regarding certain groups is worthwhile.  The next sections of this chapter will discuss how discourse about terrorism may reflect state-level policies and interests for certain groups, as well as how content 
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analysis has been used to capture linguistic differences in discourse about a set of terrorist groups.    
Case Studies: How Terrorism Discourse Changes US officials monitor media coverage of most events to track how they reflect on the United States (Public Library of US Diplomacy, 2015).   The effort that the state makes to understand how it is treated in the media suggests that officials hope to see the media shape reports to fit their interests, and intends to engage with domestic and international media sources to shape discourse.  Theoretically, the baseline condition of any group with political aims is unlisted and unimportant to US interests.  The use of violence, combined with the geopolitical context of that use, may shift interests and result in designation as a terrorist group.  Once elite interest in a group’s activities increases, media attention may intensify for the organization.  The tone and implications of that attention is contextualized by the groups’ current designation status.  Changes in a groups’ baseline condition affect US policy choices and media interests as even independent news sources may attempt to align stories about group activities with state policy concerns.  This chapter looks at the two basic questions that arise from these baseline conditions: Does an organization’s designation as a terrorist group influence treatment by the media and the public?  Do changes in state-level interests affect media treatment?    The follow sections will use content analysis to examine how different groups are treated by the media given state interests in the group and its listing status.  I start by examining the Taliban and Hezbollah, two groups that have garnered high levels of media attention and foreign policy interest.  While Hezbollah 
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has been listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since the inception of the FTO list in 1997, the Afghani Taliban has never been formally designated.  Next, I examine the PKK, which has also been considered an FTO since 1997, but has operated since the late 1970s.  US interests in Turkish affairs have shifted several times over the lifespan of this group, shaping its treatment in the US media.   Table 3.1: Case studies.  
 Third, I discuss ETA, the Basque separatist group that has operated against both the autocratic Franco regime and the democratic Spain that emerged after Franco’s death.  Next, I look at how the MEK has been handled by the media, as one of the few groups to directly engage US decision-makers over listing decisions.  Finally, I compare treatment of all groups with a short discussion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a group that shares some characteristics of the other discussed groups, but operated in a region that currently garners less foreign policy interest.    
Methods 




Yearly Average Taliban* Afghanistan 17 (1996-2012) 11,932 83 (1997) 1,954 (2001) 702 Hezbollah Lebanon 27 (1988-2014) 1,942 6 (1995) 662 (2006) 72 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) Turkey 23 (1992-2014) 1, 510 19 (2004) 188 (2007) 66 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)** Iran 12 (2003-2014) 189 3 (2008 & 2014) 41 (2013) 16 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)* Spain 22 (1988-2009) 619 6 (1992) 72 (2004) 28 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Sri Lanka 17 (1995-2011) 2, 611 55 (1997) 351 (2008) 154 * Data is from the New York Times only ** Data also includes Washington Post articles 
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Content analysis of discourse surrounding a group can shed light on whether or not listing has any effects on the group, at least in the public sphere.  Content analysis is a method for examining discourse through textual analysis in order to find patterns in the word choice, tone, and general presentation of events around a certain topic.  In this case, I use content analysis to provide qualitative evidence of the impact of listing on how a group is perceived by decision-makers and the public.  These perceptions are affected by the listing status of the group, by the features of the state that the group claims to be fighting, and by the foreign policy interests that the listing state has.   I expect that groups will be judged based on the feelings the public has about terrorism and about institutional features of the state.  Content analysis allows for examination of public discourse through the use of texts that describe or comment on certain phenomena.  Examining texts allows for a qualitative analysis of the way language is shaped and its influence on behavioral choices (Krippendorff, 2004).  In the case of terrorist violence, states can use their claim of legitimacy to push the contention that certain groups’ actions are illegitimate means to interact with the state.  Groups labeled as terrorist organizations may be treated differently by the media than groups acting without that label.  Substate groups that are not given the terrorist designation may be perceived as acting more legitimately against an unjust state, while states that use force to fight terrorism are using appropriate means to fight illegitimate groups.  Broader public knowledge of group activities can be shaped by the media’s descriptions of actions and actors, which are influenced by 
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the state.  Public opinion will be shaped by these competing claims of legitimacy from the violent group and the state.  In this work, content analysis is used to show how affixing words such as 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' to certain groups and actions affects the way that the public perceives those groups and actions.  Different descriptions of the same phenomena could lead to differing perceptions of the event or group.  Realizing how governments and state entities work to shape discourse is important in understanding why some groups' actions are considered legitimate and others not.  The content analysis for the case studies to follow will look at newspaper stories along with elite pronouncements to trace the evolution of discourse about separate substate groups that have used violence against state structures.    Content analysis helps describe the process and consequences of labeling groups that act against interests of the state in a methodologically distinct way.  This chapter will give an in-depth look at the way public discourse through news accounts of violent events can shape the public view of the group.  The analysis will also shed light on which factors are perceived as important in determining whether or not a group is a terrorist organization, so that we can see the interaction between state and group characteristics and how they affect labeling practices.    
Hezbollah and the Taliban Both Hezbollah and the Taliban have been the focus of large amounts of Western media attention over the last two decades.  Hezbollah, primarily operating in Lebanon, has been officially designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 
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the inception of the current version of the watch list in 1997.  The Taliban, operating in Afghanistan, has never been officially designated.4  Both groups have used violence to challenge the government of the state in which they operate, and both groups have at some point been involved in governance of the state.  As discussed in earlier chapters, the Islamic ideologies of both groups should be likely to increase the probability of designation.5   Overall, the contexts in which both group operates should place them in opposition to US interests.  The major difference between the two is that Hezbollah is labeled as a terrorist organization while the Taliban is not.  The US has consistently opposed Hezbollah as a threat to peace in the Middle East and, along with Hamas, is seen as a menace towards peace in Israel (Home Office Cable, 2005; Bolton, 2006).  During the 2006 war, US officials strongly opposed Hezbollah’s inroads into the Lebanese political process.  In 2007, President Bush issues Executive Order 13441 deny entry to the United States and block the assets of any person acting in Lebanon that “have taken, or to pose a significant risk of taking, actions, including acts of violence, that have the purpose or effect of undermining Lebanon's democratic processes or institutions, contributing to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon, supporting the reassertion of Syrian control or otherwise contributing to Syrian interference in Lebanon, or infringing upon or undermining Lebanese sovereignty” (Executive Order No. 13441, 2007).   People listed due to this Executive Order included many Hezbollah operatives.   Additionally, The US lobbied                                                         4 An offshoot of the Afghani Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was designated as an FTO in September 2010.  The TTP primarily operates in Pakistan.  In the media coverage I discuss in this chapter, the TTP is discussed as a separate organization.   5 Hezbollah is a Shia organization, while the Taliban is composed of Sunni Islam extremists.   
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for the group’s inclusion on the European Union’s terrorist watch list for many years, finally resulting in their designation in Europe in 2013.  Hezbollah’s political interests and influences in relation to the US’ geopolitical goals in the Middle East have not shifted significantly over the groups lifespan (Addis and Blanchard, 2011).  The Taliban have always been a brutal regime, but they became much more significant to the United States after the events of September 11, 2001.  After an intensive military campaign to remove the group’s leaders from the Afghani government, the Taliban regrouped as an insurgent force operating against the new American-backed government and its allies.  However, the US government has attempted to cast interactions between American actors and the Taliban as different than interactions with terrorist groups.  In defending differences in tactics used by the US to counter the Taliban and the Islamic State, White House spokesman Eric Schultz stated, “The Taliban is an armed insurgency, [Islamic State] is a terrorist group. So, we don’t make concessions to terrorist groups,” (Schultz, 2015).   As the US stretched its operations in the Middle East with the invasion in Iraq, the Taliban succeeded in regaining some control over territory in Afghanistan.  Critics of US operations in Afghanistan have castigated the failure to truly remove the threat of the Taliban to Afghanistan.  During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama criticized the Bush administrations invasion of Iraq, saying “that the invasion of a country posing no imminent threat would fan the flames of extremism, and distract us from the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban,” (“Obama’s Remarks”, 2008).  However, many domestic interests have pushed for the removal of US forces from 
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 Unlike Hezbollah, the Taliban shows relatively low levels of any common descriptor that might be associated with violent groups.  Despite often using similarly violent tactics as Hezbollah over the time period, the Taliban is rarely labeled as a “militant,” “guerrilla,” or “terror” group, and its members are less likely to be called “terrorists.”  Instead, following the fall of the Taliban regime after the US invasion, actions by the group is often characterized as “insurgent” or “rebel” violence, terms used to describe Hezbollah’s actions in just 0.4% and 4.2% of articles, respectively.   Figure 3.2: Percentage of Articles Calling a Group “Terrorist” per Year 














of their relationship to the United States, the results suggest that the designation itself may affect how groups are described in the media.  Certain descriptions may be more likely to be used when the group is listed as a terrorist organization, while unlisted groups are called by different terms.  Both groups experience high levels of US media interest, but their actions are framed differently.  The t-tests show significant differences in the average use of certain terms, suggesting that Hezbollah’s actions are more likely to be discussed in terms of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, while the Taliban’s actions are more often framed as the work insurgents.  Table 3.2 shows that the Taliban is sometimes called a militant or a terrorist group.  However, the Taliban is statistically less likely to be described in some terms than the designated terrorist group, Hezbollah. Given similarities in each group’s violent actions and US interest in stopping violence in the region, differences in media treatment may be explained in part by the different vocabulary used to discuss designated terrorist groups.    Table 3.2: Mean Percent of Articles in a Year Using Terms, Difference in Means Tests  Hezbollah Taliban t-score Terror/Terrorism/Terrorist 52.1% 20.6% 3.72*** Rebel 0.6% 3.2% -3.21*** Insurgent/Insurgent 0.4% 20.6% -5.01*** Militant 44.1% 16.2% 4.71*** Guerrilla 54.9% 4.6% 6.68*** Extremist 5.2% 2.9% 1.23 Years (Articles) 27 (1,942) 17 (11,932)  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   The differences between the Taliban and Hezbollah provide a baseline by which to compare subsequent cases.  Both of these groups are often covered by Western media and operate in a region of high foreign policy interest.  Subsequent groups examined in this chapter do not always experience such levels of American 
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media interest in their actions and goals, while their location, listing status, and relationships to American foreign policy concerns differ.  The Taliban and Hezbollah data can be used as a reference for how changes in conditions affect how public perceptions of groups are molded.    
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) The PKK was founded in 1984 with the stated goal of creating a Marxist Kurdish state out of the Kurdish-dominated region of southeastern Turkey.  The group has generally limited operations to the Kurdish-inhabited areas of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.  Turkey had long denied Kurds linguistic and cultural rights given to other minority groups in the country.  While Turkey reacted to the group early, establishing emergency rule of the Kurdish provinces in 1987, the PKK came into prominence in American news sources in the aftermath of the first Gulf War.  Western forces, which had used Turkish bases to launch attacks into Iraq, provided protection to Iraqi Kurds in the Northern part of the country.  The autonomous zone created with the help of American military support provided a haven for Kurdish PKK fighters seeking to attack Turkey.  Although PKK leaders claimed to have shifted the group’s goals from separatism to the creation of an autonomous zone within the Turkish state, the United States backed the Iraqi Kurds’ push for autonomy while condemning the PKK’s actions against neighboring ally Turkey.  A White House spokesperson described President Clinton’s “understanding for Turkey's need to deal decisively with PKK terrorism" (Schweid, 1995).   As Turkey continued to provide military bases used to support the Kurdish autonomous zone in Iraq throughout the late 1990s, the US looked the other way as 
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Turkish forces entered northern Iraq almost yearly.  Attacks by the PKK continued in Turkey, including threats to tourist attractions and Turkish interests abroad.  In October 1997, the PKK was added to the FTO list.  That same year, Turkey was denied membership to the European Union in part due to European concerns about violations of Kurdish minority rights.  A US State Department spokesperson also expressed concern over Turkey’s rights record at the time, stating, “We do have concerns about the manner in which the Turkish government has acted in some instances. We are troubled by continuing reports of torture, of restrictions on freedom of the press, and on some extra-judicial killings, troubled by reports of the burning of villages and the forced evacuation of villages" (Burns, 1996). Turkish incursions into northern Iraq to fight the PKK continued through the end of the decade.  The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was detained in Rome in late 1998 and eventually arrested in Kenya and extradited to Turkey for trial.  The detainment and trial resulted in high levels of media coverage and increased discussion of Kurdish rights issues in Turkey.  An official in the German foreign ministry commented on the trial outcome that, "If Turkey would like the access to Europe, then it has to come closer to the standards that prevail here in Europe," specifically referencing Kurdish minority treatment and the Turkish use of the death penalty (Geitner, 1999). Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, the US invoked NATO’s Article 5 for use of Turkish bases by American allies. Although the PKK was added to the European Union’s terrorist watch list in 2002, Turkey continued to worry about Kurdish political influence, especially as the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 
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threatened to further empower the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.  US reluctance to help Turkey against the PKK contributed to Turkey’s refusal to be involved with the Iraqi invasion.   Through the early 2000s the US sought to protect Kurds in Iraq – the most pro-American group in the country – while not alienating its NATO ally as Turkey continued its offensive against the PKK.  Northern Iraq remained strategically important for the US military, as many supply routes ran through the region.  In 2007, the Turkish parliament approved military action against the PKK despite America’s wishes that Turkey stay out of the country.  Turkey’s National Security Council President Yigit Alpogan stated that the US’ “lack of action on the PKK will have a significant impact on U.S. - Turkish relations,” while US State Department Under Secretary Nicholas Burns insisted that “Turkey must also work directly with the Iraqi government as well as Iraqi Kurd authorities” to counter the Kurdish issues (Department of State Cable, 2007a). Limited incursions into Iraq began that December following a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Kurdish issues in which Bush called the PKK a “common enemy” of both states and NSA Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated that US “has not done all it should have done” to help Turkey fight the PKK in northern Iraq (Department of State Cable, 2007b).  From 2011 through 2014, the internal and external contexts in which the PKK operated shifted dramatically.  Internally, observers have suggested that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been attempting to consolidate power and move Turkey away from secular government to one more informed by conservative 
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Islamic principles.  Erdogan has embarked on peace talks with PKK leaders, including the imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan, in order to gain more support in the southeastern part of the country.  These talks have included promises for increased Kurdish rights in exchange for the PKK laying down arms in Turkey.  During the talks, PKK members called a cease-fire in light of these concessions and have moved to have peshmerga fighters leave Turkey for outposts in Iraq.    Nevertheless, international events involving Turkey’s neighbors placed the cease-fire in a precarious position and left Turkey with goals opposed by its allies.  Western interests in the Middle East could help Kurdish interests in autonomy, despite Turkey’s wishes.  By late 2011, the results Arab Spring had seemingly strengthened Turkey’s influence in the Middle East and peace with the Kurds was seen as a means to further increase Turkey’s power.  However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war created a number of crises in which Turkey found itself with interests counter to those of the United States and European Union.  Turkey took a strong anti-Assad stance in the Syrian conflict, insisting that intervention should be with the goal of ousting the Syrian leader, while others focused more on preventing the further rise of the Islamic State (IS) and other extremist groups.  Discussing the issues in Syria, a senior official in the Obama administration said, “This isn’t how a NATO ally acts while hell is unfolding a stone’s throw from their border” (Landler et al, 2014).  Turkey’s stance left it in an uncomfortable position with its neighbor if something like the pre-conflict status quo was restored.    The coalition to fight the rise of the Islamic State and the al-Nusrah Front was hindered by Turkey’s unwillingness to join without assurances about Assad.  
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Additionally, Western and Kurdish leaders expressed frustration at Turkey’s failures to assist in the movement to counter IS.  Secretary Kerry noted that the US understood the “… fundamentals of [Turkey’s] opposition and ours, to any kind of terrorist group, and particularly, obviously, the challenges they face with respect to the P.K.K., […] But we have undertaken a coalition effort to degrade and destroy ISIL, and ISIL is presenting itself in major numbers in this place called Kobani” (Fahim and Shoumali, 2014).  Observers accused Turkey of covertly helping IS by allowing would-be IS fighters to cross the border into Syria, while blocking Kurdish pershmerga fighters (Fahim and Shoumali, 2014).  Turkey eventually relented to allow some Kurdish fighters to cross the border to combat IS, but faced accusations that passage has been slow.    Two humanitarian crises brought on by IS violence strengthened positive views of PKK fighters in the West.  IS attacks against the Yazidi people in Iraq and against the primarily Kurdish town of Kobani on the Syria-Turkey border garnered a lot of Western media attention.  In both cases, Kurdish fighters were instrumental in helping civilians survive the IS attacks, with Swedish security officials quoted as saying that people leaving Europe to fight with the PKK "aren't automatically guilty of a crime," despite European prohibitions on aiding terror groups (Olsen and Ritter, 2014).  Daily updates from both sites positively portrayed Kurdish fighters, while suggesting that Turkey was unhelpful to the cause.  Secretary of State Kerry stated that members of the PKK “are valiantly fighting ISIL” and “It would be irresponsible of us, as well morally very difficult, to turn your back on a community fighting ISIL as hard as it is at this particular moment"(Lee and Burns, 2014). 
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Both crises highlighted Turkish fears over an emboldened Kurdish people.  Power vacuums in Iraq after 2003 and in Syria as a result of the civil war allowed Kurds to carve out autonomous spaces, some of which have been used to launch attacks against Turkey.  Turkey does not wish to concede demands for similar autonomous zones within the country to its own Kurdish population, and it fears that support for Kurds operating abroad will harm its internal bargaining position.  Overall, both Turkey and the PKK have seen the context of their interaction with the United States shift over the course of the lifespan of the PKK.  The changes in US interests in relation to Turkey and the PKK can be further explored using content analysis of articles concerning the PKK over the timespan described above.  The US’s stance towards the PKK can be divided into several distinct time periods, and treatment between those periods can be tested to see if coverage of the group has changed.  From 1991 to 1997, post-Gulf War interests and American reliance on Turkish bases to protect northern Iraq dominated US interests.  The arrest of Öcalan in 1998 and Kurdish rights concerns emanating from the European Union were prominent until 2001.  The events of September 11 placed a renewed emphasis on fighting terrorism in the Middle East, and Turkey’s military operated against PKK bases in northern Iraq even as the United States sought stability in the country following its invasion.  At the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the Turkish Prime Minister sought increasing inclusion of Kurds in Turkey, promising unprecedented Kurdish minority rights. Turkish Kurds claimed that Erdogan’s promises had not been met as the world’s attention turned to the events of the Arab Spring.  The aftermath of the events Arab Spring preceded the rise of extremism and 
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2013-2014 Terrorist /Terror/Terrorism 0.028*** 22.7*** 15.4*** 0.22 2.81* Rebel 0.082*** 36.5*** 20.4*** 2.67 73.4*** Militant 0.030*** 0.91 22.9*** 0.07 0.08 Guerrilla  0.141*** 21.3*** 0.08 62.7*** 0.57 Insurgent 0.069*** 2.85* 0.01 0.46 62.4*** Separatist 0.040*** 26.5*** 6.45** 11.9*** 0.88 Articles (N) 1,515 303 v. 298 298 v. 332 332 v. 400 400 v. 182 *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  Table 3.3 shows that I can reject the null hypothesis that the means in all five time periods are equal in every case.  Looking further, differences between subgroupings emerge showing significant differences present in treatment for different time periods.  However, Hotelling T-squared statistic does not give any indication of the direction of change.  By looking at the changes in the mean percentage of articles using these terms, Figure 3.3 helps visualize the points in time 
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where treatment of the PKK has shifted while also showing the relative usages of each term in comparison to the others.  Members of the PKK were most likely to be called “terrorists” and their actions most commonly called “terror” or “terrorism” between 1998 and 2001, most likely because of the press’ interest in the Öcalan terrorism trial.  Usage of the term significantly reduced from 2002-2007 and again in 2013-2014.  These trends perhaps reflect American issues with Turkey’s refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq by allowing American forces access to Turkish bases and the reliance on PKK fighters in countering the Islamic State in Syria, respectively.   Figure 3.3: Mean Percent of Articles Using Terms at Different Time Periods 
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increases following the September 11 attacks and subsequent increase in US interest in terrorist activity and has held steady since.  The term “guerrilla” dropped significantly after Öcalan’s arrest in 1998 and again during the 2008-2012 interval, both periods characterized by increased media interest in Kurdish rights.  While “insurgent” shows a slight drop after 1997, it stays at steady low levels of usage until 2013, when it shoots up significantly.  This final period is characterized by discussion of the PKK in relation to other violent regional groups, including the Islamic State, which is also listed as an FTO.    Finally, the usage of the “separatist” term drops significantly after the 1991-1997 period before rising in the period immediately following September 11.  Describing the PKK as a separatist in any of these time periods is strange in that the PKK dropped their separatism demands in favor of demands for autonomy within the Turkish state very soon after its formation.  Its use in any of these periods reflects a failure to take the groups’ specific goals into account when discussing their actions.    Beyond these term measures, I also look at three potential measures of tone towards the PKK.  Because treatment of the group is tied to the relationship between Turkey and the West, I coded for criticism of Turkey from both domestic and international sources.  Domestic criticisms includes quoted complaints about the Turkish government’s handling of international and domestic security issues by Turkish citizens and groups, including issues related to the PKK’s demands. International criticism includes statements critical of Turkish positions from 
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2013-2014 Considered a Terrorist Organization 0.203*** 0.76 108.4*** 1.14 3.12* Discussions critical to Turkish  Government – from  International Source 0.031*** 2.37 9.03*** 42.6*** 9.91*** Discussions critical to Turkish Government – from Domestic Source 0.027*** 9.20*** 13.9*** 10.1*** 8.59*** Articles (N) 1,515 303 v. 298 298 v. 332 332 v. 400 400 v. 182 *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  Figure 3.4 can help illuminate differences across the time periods covered.  Notably, discussion of the PKK’s presence on terrorist watch lists shoots up after 2001, probably due to increased public interest in terror threats.  Discussion of listing was infrequent in the five years between the placement of the group on the FTO list and the September 2001 terror attacks.  Items including the PKK’s classification in context of a story have been increasing since.  Coverage of 
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international and domestic criticism of Turkey has varied over the time included in my sample.  Criticism from international sources has generally been more reported than criticism from domestic sources.  Figure 3.4: Mean Percent of Articles Using Terms at Different Time Periods 
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Generally, the media’s treatment of the PKK and Turkey indicate that coverage does shift depending on the interests of the listing state and the newspapers’ intended audience.  As the New York Times and the Associated Press assess the impact of a violent group’s actions on the United States, treatment of the group and its actions is subject to change.  Even though the PKK’s goals and Turkey’s opposition to them stayed constant, discourse shifted because of transformations in American foreign policy interests.  These results suggest that designation’s effects can change depending on other geopolitical factors.  Listing mediates treatment, rather than determining public opinion going forward.    
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) The Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) formed in 1959 as a reaction in part to the region’s especially harsh treatment under the Franco regime.  ETA’s primary goals include an independent Basque state incorporating the Spanish Basque communities Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Álava, the neighboring Spanish province of Navarre and the bordering French Basque region (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990).  Following Franco’s death in 1975, Spanish authorities began the process of democratization and reintegration with Europe.  The constitution-making process included major concessions in granting a level of autonomous rule to the Basque Country and Catalonia in order to appease separatist demands in both regions while still incorporating them into the newly democratic state.  However, the concessions were met by an increase in the level of violence by ETA against the state (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005).  ETA has actively used violence since at least the 
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mid-1960s until the 2010 ceasefire agreement.  Today, the United States, Spain, France, and the European Union all classify ETA as a terrorist organization.  ETA has existed in present form over two very different versions of the Spanish state: a closed society ruled by a dictatorship, and an open, economically integrated democracy.  I argue that the differences in the Spanish state, and the perceptions outsiders had about Spain’s place in world politics explain differences in public opinion about ETA’s goals and tactics.    The Spanish case offers a natural experiment in which to test the impact of institutions on terrorist group activities. If the institutions of the Spanish state changed while ETA’s aims and tactics remained the same, then the change in attitudes towards ETA may be due the institutional context.  That is, international actors may perceive some uses of violence by substate actors as more legitimate in an autocratic state than in a democratic one.  I argue that the international community views actions of subnational groups in the context of national political institutions.  The labeling of separatist groups as terrorists rather than freedom fighters could have as much to do with the character of national political institutions that groups operate within as with the tactics the group uses.   Table 3.5 presents the proportion of articles that use certain terms over both time periods, as well as the results of a t-test of the difference in proportions between the samples.   As Table 3.5 shows, labeling practices shifted between the time series.  Descriptions of ETA as a terrorist or separatist group and its members as militants, rebels, or guerrillas became significantly more common after the transition to democracy.  On the other hand, descriptions of ETA as a nationalist group drop 
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significantly.  This drop perhaps implies that nationalist groups are perceived as groups that act legitimately against state oppression, or have legitimate claims to territory, whereas separatist and terrorist groups are acting through extralegal means.    Table 3.5: Frequency of Labels Used to Describe ETA, 1959-2009 
 1959 – 1977 1978 – 2009 z-score Terrorist 18.39 30.36 5.07*** Separatist 26.03 71.61 17.26*** Nationalist 34.64 2.59 -18.07*** Rebel 1.17 8.04 5.46*** Guerrilla 13.70 21.88 3.88*** Militant 5.09 7.77 1.98** Terrorism 7.24 19.20 6.20*** Articles (N) 511 1120  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 The notable drop in the use of the term nationalist is mirrored by the increase in the use of the term separatist, which becomes ETA’s most common descriptor.  Figure 3.5 presents the comparative rise of ‘separatist’ along with the steep drop in the use of ‘nationalist’ as a percentage of articles in a given year.  As shown, the drop in one term is mirrored at the same time by the rise in the other.  The timeframe of the shift from ETA as a nationalist organization to a separatist one roughly represents the period of transition, from approximately 1973 to 1978.  The timing of the linguistic shift as well as its steepness suggests that some authors made deliberate decisions to change the terms used to describe ETA.  The shift could be indicative of a shift in perceptions about the Spanish state as it transitioned into a more open economic and political climate and connected itself to the European Community.   Over seventy percent of articles in the second time period describe ETA as a separatist group, while the use of the nationalist label drops precipitously.  Another 
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possibility for this decline is the advent of the Basque Nationalist Party (BNP).  The BNP represents moderate Basque interests in expanding the autonomy of the region and gaining more power from the Spanish state without advocating for complete separation from Spain.  Once a political party takes on the label of ‘nationalist,’ it is no longer applied to ETA because its interests are perceived to be more radical and it does not use acceptable political channels.   Figure 3.5: Percentage of articles per year using terms ‘Separatist,’ ‘Nationalist,’ 1959-2009 









ambivalence about ETA that is resolved by the transition of the state to a more normatively good institutional structure.  One way to look at the incidence of the use of labeling overall is to construct an indicator variable that combines a number of terms and gauges the relative severity of their use (OECD, 2008).   In this case, a composite indicator can show how linguistic choices have changed over time to portray ETA in different lights that suited overarching state interests.  I have constructed a simple composite indicator for four of the terms measured in Table 3.5: “rebel”, “militant,” “guerrilla,” and “terrorist.”  These terms were ranked according to the strength of the term’s implications with extralegal terror activities, based on my observations of the overall usage in terror-related reporting.  “Rebel” was coded as a 1, “militant” as a 2, “guerrilla” as a 3, and “terrorist” as 4.  I then used the rankings as a multiplier of the frequency of the terms use per year in the data and took a weighted average of the use of all four terms.  The resulting indicator shows the incidence of all four terms’ use in discussions of ETA, as well as the relative severity of descriptions of the group and its actions.  Figure 3.6 shows the five-year moving average of this indicator with a 95% confidence interval over time.    The figure shows the same trends found in Table 3.5 in greater detail.  Use of all four terms steadily increases as the Franco regime comes to an end.  Severity of usages spikes in the 1980s at around the time Spain joins the European Union, and at a time when ETA was very violent.  Usage and severity stay fairly steady after the first peak, even though ETA’s use of violence has waxed and waned.  The slight decline in the late 1990s and into the 2000s may reflect both a weakening of ETA’s 
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forces and a decreased in media attention as Mideast terrorism came to be a policy focus.  Figure 3.6: Composite Indicator over Time, 1968-2009 


























democracy.  While the Spanish state worked to adjust its tactics to conform to democratic norms, this was not an automatic process.  As has later been revealed, during the transitional period and into the 1980s, police continued to use tactics not associated with democratic societies, including torture and unlawful imprisonment.   Table 3.6: Tonal Differences in Reporting about ETA, 1959-2009 
 1959 – 1977 1978 – 2009 z-score Aims of Independence 15.46 20.18 2.27** In Response to State Actions 30.33 5.63 -13.60*** Public Support 20.35 4.64 -10.01*** Lacking Public Support 3.13 10.27 4.92*** Articles (N) 511 1120  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  The Spanish state effectively fought a dirty war against ETA in the 1980s, going so far as to create the Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (GAL).   GAL was composed of covert police operatives who committed a series of bombings and assassinations in Spain and the French Basque country against ETA members and sympathizers (Encarnación, 2007). While many suspected that GAL was supported by the Spanish state and ETA members who had been detained often described vicious police treatments, very little of these facts were reported in the New York 
Times until years later when controversy about the government’s role in GAL forced Prime Minister Felipe González out of office in the mid-1990s (Encarnación, 2007; Alonso, 2011). At least in the immediate time period after democratic transition it was not that Spain’s actions against ETA shifted to reflect democratic norms.  Rather, reporting about Spain’s fight with ETA focused on the negative actions of ETA while failing to note the issues with the behavior of government officials.    It is possible that ETA’s treatment is due to the perception that Spain was dealing with ETA through democratic governance, rather than the harsh measures 
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that were often implemented during the Franco regime.  As such, the actions of the democratic regime were less problematic for foreign reporters and so there was no need to counter the violence of ETA with mentions of violent state action.  Further, later news stories often present the views of French officials while noting that France’s policies towards harboring ETA fugitives changed after the democratic transition.  Stories after the transition often note France’s willingness to cooperate with the Spanish government now that ETA will be dealt with by a democracy. Overall, these changes in reporting suggest a difference in tone and interest after the Spanish democratic transition.  These differences may reflect a change in international opinion about ETA as they moved from fighting a dictatorship to fighting a democracy using similar methods.    Table 3.6 reports two additional codings meant to note when the articles mentioned either that ETA’s action were being viewed favorably, or when those actions were met with public resistance.  Favorable public actions included descriptions of rallies held in favor of ETA prisoners, quotations from Spaniards expressing sympathy for the cause, and calls from international actors for amnesty of ETA members, among other examples.  Unfavorable public actions include demonstrations against ETA violence, condemnation by international actors, and notation of the inclusion of ETA on terrorist watch lists, among others.  This code does not include condemnations from the Spanish state.  Only public and international actions in relation to ETA are noted.    The results show that overall reports of expressions of public support fell in the later time period, while reports of negative feelings towards ETA increased.  
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These results conform to the earlier hypotheses that the institutional features of the state will affect opinions and actions towards the violent group.  As Spain transitioned to democracy, its actions in dealing with ETA became more accepted.  Opinion against ETA’s actions and goals turned, leading to more coverage of demonstrations and criticism against the group.  In the earlier time period, the Franco dictatorship did not act through democratic channels, and so ETA enjoyed a higher level of public and international support as shown in its treatment in the New 
York Times.  
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) was initially listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997.  After a concerted lobbying campaign, the group was removed from the list in late 2012.  The MEK was founded to oppose US-backed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, and helped bring about regime change in 1979.  The MEK’s mix of secular Islam, Marxism, and cultish devotion to its leaders caused the group to quickly fall-out with the new Iranian regime.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the MEK allied itself with Saddam Hussein, who allowed the MEK to reside in Iraq, where it coordinated a number of cross-border attacks into Iran.   The Iranian government implicated the group in numerous violent attacks over the time period, including incidences that led to American deaths.  MEK leaders claimed to have renounced violence in 2001, although Iranian officials still assert that they are involved in terrorist activities.  
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 The MEK campaigned heavily for removal from both the US and European Union terrorist watch lists.  Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the context in which the MEK operated shifted.  The US military disarmed the MEK in Iraq during the 2003 invasion.  After laying down arms, MEK members were declared “protected persons,” and US troops guarded their residence, Camp Ashraf.  In 2009, as the US military pulled out of the country, the safety of MEK members at Camp Ashraf was turned over to Iraqi security forces.  However, the fall of Saddam Hussein left the MEK in a precarious position as the new Iraqi regime wished to maintain closer ties with Iran.  Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) stated in a 2012 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing that, “members of the MEK…are in great danger. Our designation to their organization as a terrorist organization has been a major stumbling block in efforts to resettle them and take them to safety”  (Assessing US Foreign Policy, 2012).  The majority of Iraqis disliked the group for the support it had received from Hussein and saw the members as illegally residing in the country.  Militants attacked Camp Ashraf in 2009 and Iraqi forces clashed with residents of the compound in 2011.  The new Iraqi regime pushed for removal of the MEK from the country, although return to Iran was not seen as tenable since the Iranian government has executed numerous people accused of having ties to the MEK.   MEK leaders maintained that the terrorist designation has slowed the process further by making states reluctant to take in members while giving the Iraqi military justification for harassment of group members remaining in Iraq.  In addition, favorable treatment of the MEK was so likely to anger Iran that Secretary of State Dick Armitage stated 
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that the US “shouldn't have been signing a cease-fire with a foreign terrorist organization,” (Kessler, 2003).   As part of the Iraqi demands for the MEK to vacate the country, the government declared that the group must leave Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s longtime home near the Iraq-Iran border.  Ashraf was a target for extremists, and many observers expected increased bloodshed if the MEK refused to move.  After some confrontations with Iraqi forces, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made relocation from Camp Ashraf to Camp Liberty, located near Baghdad, a condition for review of MEK’s terrorist designation by the United States, saying that, “given the ongoing efforts to relocate the residents, MEK cooperation in the successful and peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main paramilitary base, will be a key factor in any decision regarding the MEK’s FTO status" (U.S. Department of State, 2012).  The presence of the MEK in Iraq subsequent to the 2003 invasion placed the United States in a difficult position.  The group had originally been listed in 1997 as part of a Clinton-era thaw in relations with Iran, and many predicted that Iran would react unfavorably to any moves to delist the group.  Conversely, the laws surrounding designation made helping MEK members leave Iraq difficult despite fears of a humanitarian crisis if members were left in the country.  Other states refused to take in members of a designated terrorist organization, and any person who lobbied for helping MEK members faced the potential of prosecution under the “material support” clause of the US Code.  The MEK brought a number of politicians and security officers into their aggressive lobbying campaign for removal from the watch list, inciting a Treasury Department review for violations of the material 
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support clause in early 2012.  In addition to currying political support, the MEK also offered intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program to US officials as a bargaining chip in exchange for consideration for removal from the FTO list.  The combination of campaigning by the MEK and its lobbyists and assistance to the intelligence community created a split in views about the group between the Department of Defense and the Department of State.  Throughout the invasion of Iraq and the designation review process, the Department of State maintained that the MEK was a terrorist organization whose members were subject to the full legal ramifications of that designation.  In 2012, the United States Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, stated that the MEK was an organization with a “violent history against the United States,” and any legal imperatives for their delisting were “quite plainly wrong” (Department of State Special Briefing, 2012).  Actors for the United States would be circumscribed in what they could do as a result of the designation.  Lobbyists and defense interests pushed for removal of the group from the FTO list.  In addition to their contributions to intelligence about Iran’s nuclear capabilities, many lobbyists suggested that the group was the best means available to push for democratic reform within Iran, although the MEK does not seem to be highly supported within the country.  For example, Former UN Ambassador Bill Richardson advocated “…new approaches to talk to the Iranian people — one is through the MEK group” (Rezaian, 2011).  Eventually, the US Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ordered a review of the group’s listing status with a final decision to remove the group coming in October 2012.   
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Content analysis of three American news sources – the New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Associated Press – allows me to examine how the differences in opinion about the MEK within the US establishment have played out from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the United States’ 2009 withdrawal to the MEK’s removal from the terrorist watch list in 2012.   Overall, 189 articles discussing the MEK were published by these outlets from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2013.  The MEK has been written about notably less than other groups discussed in this chapter, suggesting that the potential impact on US foreign policy plays a role in how much coverage any group receives from the media.  Most articles focus on the MEK’s position in Iraq relative to American policy goals and the conflict over their treatment between the Department of State and Department of Defense.  The MEK is rarely described in the same language that is used for groups like the PKK or ETA.  Only 13.8% of articles refer to members of the groups as “terrorists,” 2.1% of call members “rebels,” and just 0.5% call MEK members “insurgents,” while 12.7% refer to actions of the group as terror or terrorism.   The MEK’s position in Iraq complicated policy decisions for the United States.  Their status as a terrorist organization should have limited the actions that US personnel could take to help the MEK’s position, but the group’s mission to oust the Iranian regime is aligned with US policy goals.  A Washington Post article specifically discusses Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s 2006 decision to refer to the group as a “dissident” organization rather than a terrorist group despite their listing status at the time (Kamen, 2006).  The MEK is most commonly described as a “militant group” or “opposition group” throughout the articles, and articles are significantly 
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more likely to use the “militant” descriptor after US troops leave in 2009.  At that point, Iraqi troops were tasked with protecting members of a listed FTO at the same time as the Iraqi government sought to establish closer ties with the Iranian regime that the US opposes.   Table 3.7: Percentage of articles calling the MEK describing the MEK as “militant” or “opposition group, ”2003-2013  2003-2008 2009-2013 t-score 
Militant 5.56% 14.81% -2.11** 
Opposition Group 42.59% 55.56% -1.61 
N 54 135  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  American newspaper coverage of the MEK also focuses on the lobbying effort to remove the group from the FTO list.  The MEK legally challenged their designation status and convinced many prominent politicians and military officials to speak on their behalf.  Thirty-six people are mentioned by name as having spoken out for delisting the MEK, including Representative Tom Ridge (R-PA), Governor of Pennsylvania Ed Rendell, and Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA).  Most names are mentioned in more than one article.  In addition, six interest groups are named as promoting the MEK’s delisting cause.  Coverage of lobbying efforts also significantly increased after the US left the MEK in such a precarious position in Iraq in 2009.  Table 3.8: Percentage of articles mentioning on lobbying efforts to remove the MEK from the FTO list, 2003-2013  2003-2008 2009-2013 t-score 
Lobbying efforts 9.00% 31.85% -2.33** 
N 54 135     *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
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  Figure 3.7: Percentage of total articles mentioning MEK’s classification as a terrorist group by any state and mentioning classification as an FTO.  







Total mentions of classification Mention of FTO classification
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The changing status of the MEK for the US and its closest allies, along with the general reliance on the idea of identification as a terrorist group can be seen in the set of articles from 2003 to 2013.  The reliance on the language about who considers the group a terrorist organization suggests that writers expect readers to understand the connection between listing status and actions.  Designation can act as shorthand for the predisposition of states towards groups and the designation places the group in the context of foreign policy interests.    
A Comparison Across Groups: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) The LTTE allows for comparisons of media treatment across all groups examined in this chapter.  The group shares significant characteristics with the groups previously discussed, helping to illuminate overall trends in terrorism discourse.  Like the PKK in Turkey and ETA in Spain, LTTE sought to create a separate state for Tamil ethnics in the north and east of Sri Lanka.   The group pursued their separatist aims through high levels of violence interspersed with ceasefires, similar to other groups that gained a lot of media attention (Stokke, 2006).  According to the Global Terrorism Database, the LTTE was responsible for an average of 58 attacks per year from 1995 until their defeat in 2009, and an average of 329 deaths per year were attributed to the group over the same time period.  The GTD attributed 41 attacks and 132 deaths per year to the PKK from 1992 until 2011, and 207 attacks and 532 deaths per year have been attributed to the Taliban since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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The LTTE has been listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since the inception of the current watch list in 1997.  However, the Tigers’ opposition to the Sri Lankan state might not have the same foreign policy impact as groups like ETA and the PKK, which fight closer allies of the United States.  That is, the LTTE’s actions might not have the same impact of US interests as other groups covered here (Nadarajah and Sriskanarajah, 2005).  Still, support for the PKK and LTTE were the test cases argued in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, a 2010 court case that sustained the material support clause of the US code.  The outcome of that case found both groups to be terrorist organizations, and any form of support for them was found to be illegal (Cole, 2012).  The MEK has also challenged its treatment by the United States in court.   Additionally, the Tamil Tigers engaged directly with the Sri Lankan military, much like Hezbollah did with the Israeli forces in 2006 and the Taliban has with forces in Afghanistan (Stokke, 2006).  Like ETA and the PKK, the LTTE is fighting a democratic state, and which claims that countering LTTE is ‘fighting terrorism’ (Nadarajah and Sriskanarajah, 2005).    Using the same composite indictor discussed in the analysis of ETA, I can look at how five groups were treated over their life spans.  All four commonly used terms are found in discussions of Hezbollah, the Taliban, the PKK, ETA, and the LTTE.  Figure 3.8 shows the three-year moving average of the relative usage and severity of word choice for each group.6  The figure shows results similar to what was found in the analysis of each group.                                                           6 Graphs of three-year moving averages of each individual term in the indicator are available in the Appendix to this chapter.  
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Figure 3.8: Composite Indicator over Time 






























Figure 3.9: Insurgent three-year moving averages 
  Figure 3.10: Separatist three-year moving averages 
















has seen a fairly steady rise in its description as an insurgency, especially since 2003.  No other groups covered here are frequently described as an insurgent operation by the media.   “Separatist” tends to be utilized more frequently than “insurgent” when it is used to described groups.  Still, only half of the groups studied here see the word crop up.  Of those, ETA is described as a separatist group most frequently.  This trend may suggest that the use of “separatist” is related to the state from which the group wishes to separate.  That is, the term could applied more often to group trying to form a new European nation, rather than one operating elsewhere. The Tamil Tigers are described as a separatist in a little over 30% of all articles.  Notably, the LTTE and the PKK are never described as a nationalist group, as ETA has been.  In fact, in both cases “nationalist” tends to be used to describe those in the state opposing the violent groups, which may suggest that the meaning of the term has shifted since ETA’s inception even for groups like the Tigers that aim to create a new ethnic nation.   Unlike every other group covered, every term discussed above is applied to the LTTE measurable levels.  Combined with the organization’s relative insignificance for current US foreign policy, the wide variety of terms applied to the LTTE could suggest that groups that do not pique US foreign policy interests do not retain a set of descriptions the way a group that garners more attention could.  That is, without the focus from policy circles and elite actors, media reports do not have a set of predetermined labels to apply to a group. Without having cues from elite 
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sources, the way a group is presented to the public through the media is less consistent.    
Conclusion 
 This chapter looked at six case studies in order to examine the impact of elite interests in terrorist groups on media coverage.  Media coverage represents a common way for individuals to learn about violent groups and will likely affect how the public understands a group’s motivations and actions.  I have shown here that for certain groups, treatment varies depending on their relations to US foreign interests.  Groups may be treated differently depending on whether or not they are listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, whether or not they are operating in a region where US interests are high, and whether or not they are willing to interact with the elites that shape discourse.    These results back up the claims from previous chapters that the way violent groups are treated is not just a function of normative proscriptions against violence.   Rather, this media treatment indicates that approaches to groups can vary depending on what interests are of most concern to those in power.  Groups that touch on current foreign policy interests may be labeled using certain predictable terms, and their actions described in certain ways.  Organizations that act farther away from foreign policy interests may not see their discussion in the media follow such patterns.    This analysis of media discourse about violent groups suggests a number of considerations about the role of elite decision-making on public discourse.  I argue 
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that the state’s policy decisions play a role in shaping public discourse.  The terrorist watch list designation is generally considered to have a negligible impact on counterterror policy, but even seemingly small government decisions can have impacts in terms of public opinion. Effects on public discussion due to linguistic choices about designations have effects on policy that may be able to be predicted and therefore utilized by decision-makers.  The government can influence the public by creating an atmosphere in which information in the media is arbitrated through state choices.  Violent groups are then affected as their actions are mediated through the lens of the dominant viewpoint about threat.     
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 This dissertation examines the policymaking process that is at the center of how counterterrorism measures are perceived.  Without properly understanding how violent groups come to the attention of states, we cannot judge their ability to act in this policy sphere.  My main argument is that states and decision-makers seek to control the discourse surrounding terrorist groups.  By making judgments about which groups fall under this label, states can affect how the public views groups and actions both by and against these groups.  Decisions in even the seemingly insubstantial policy area of listing designations are strategic and preformed by self-interested members of the government who seek to have their interests met through the decision-making process.  Moreover, the final watchlisting decisions have impact on how the public perceives the actions of groups who use violence against states.  
Contributions  This work contributes to how researchers understand counterterrorism in a number of ways.  First, the study gives a more nuanced take at a complex policy process that has generally been overlooked.  Before we can judge how states react to terrorist threats, we must grasp how states decide whom they are fighting.  Second, the study sheds light on how foreign policy decisions can affect domestic audiences and political leaders.  Foreign policy calculations can affect how leaders 
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Policy Implications I argue that the designation process is a cornerstone of an effective counterterrorism policy.  This dissertation highlights a number of concerns that policymakers should consider when utilizing the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. First, the role of terrorist designation and the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in achieving counterterror aims should be recognized more fully.  The list is a key tool in preventing terror within the United States.  Increased application of the consequences of the FTO list where appropriate can help protect the United States from threats on terrorist attacks on US soil.  Listing offers a means to monitor and constrain potential threats.  However, coordination between the foreign policy bureaucracy, intelligence services, and the executive office over listing decisions is needed in order to take full advantage of the benefits of designation.  Utilizing the FTO list most effectively under the US Code will result in more actionable intelligence needed to prevent terror attacks.   While the consequences of this list are well understood by certain actors in the Department of State and Department of Justice, the usefulness of designation is limited due its low priority status within the larger concerns of these departments.  A greater focus on listing  – along with an increased budget to mete out its consequences  – could in the end improve the effectiveness of the counterterror bureaucracy.  The role of the FTO list often seems overlooked in favor of other, more active forms of counterterror.  Acknowledgement that the FTO is an important first step in policy could result in a more productive security system.    Second, the FTO list needs to be used carefully to make the best policy decisions possible.  In order to use the list to its full potential, decision-makers need 
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to understand the possible pitfalls of listing.  Misuse of the FTO list reduces confidence in decision-makers and will make policymakers more likely to look for alternatives to achieve policy goals.  The designation process should not be subject to influence by outside interests.  Clear directives and open communication between departments is necessary to make sure the list is used effectively within its scope.   A dedicated research staff and a clear definition of what US interests are served by inclusion on a watch list are important to using the FTO list correctly.  Policymakers must weight the benefits of listing a person or group against the real threat posed by these entities.  Application of FTO status should not be automatic for groups operating in certain regions or with certain ideologies.  Instead, real understanding of a group’s tactics, goals, and relationship to US interests is needed before listing.  The Department of State’s Counterterrorism Bureau already has mechanisms for research and oversight of groups that are brought to its attention, but the Bureau needs the staff and budget to make sure that listing is done with the proper care in all instances.   Third, this study highlights the role of the media in presenting information about international policy to the public.  The media shapes the discourse about international policy issues in much the same way it can affect domestic policy discourse.  Policymakers should understand that how information presented to media sources could affect how the general public views policy implementation.  The Foreign Terrorist Organization list is more easily accessible to the public than many other aspects of counterterror policy in part because of its use in media discussions of terror activities.  Given the emphasis on the FTO list in reporting 
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about terrorism, policymakers should think through the message that they wish to send about the status of a group before making a listing decision.  It is likely that designation will strongly shape the presentation of interactions between that group and the state going forward.     The media’s presentation of policy affects the public’s understanding of how the security sector functions within the larger world of foreign policy.  The Foreign Terrorist Organization list can be an accessible way for decision-makers to communicate with larger audiences about security concerns and counterterrorism’s place in the state’s larger foreign policy goals.  Those concerns may more easily translate to other actions when the FTO list is cogently presented to the public.  Good relations with media covering counterterror issues can improve the effectiveness of policy by enhancing the narrative surrounding overall counterterror policy choices.   Fourth, interest in designation status highlights the role of public consumption of information on the policy process.  With every new terror event, the placement of the perpetrators on the terrorist watch list is a central question of early media coverage.  The prominent position of designation in reports on terror attacks means that FTO designation plays a large role in the public’s understanding of counterterror operations.  In the media’s discourse, an efficient and accurate process of terrorist designation is framed as a necessary part of terrorism prevention.  Therefore, clear and precise presentation of what listing means is important for communication between policymakers and the public.   
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Nevertheless, policymakers need to be careful that designation is not overemphasized.  The media’s persistence in using the failure to list any given perpetrator suggests that the overall usefulness of designation may be overstated to the public.  The FTO list provides the state with a number of resources to counter potential avenues of terrorist financing, movement, and communication. However, the FTO list can only work in tandem with other forms of counterterror action.  Communication about the list should help make the goals and limitations of the list clear.   Finally, the consequences of listing for groups and individuals caught in the designation process needs to be taken into account before decision-makers act.  Actors must realize that designation decisions have the potential to affect innocent parties.  The limited recourse for such individuals has been a focus in Congressional discussions of listing practices, suggesting that the potential of the FTO to circumscribe rights of US citizens should be weighed before designation.  Potential means to address incorrect or misattributed listings should be made clearer by agencies that refer to lists to enact the consequences of designation. Since the consequences of listing can be so severe in and of themselves, designation should not be treated as an afterthought or a step towards other policy decisions.  Decision-makers should take care that designation is made only of groups that reach the criteria set out in the US Code.  In addition, oversight is important to make sure that political concerns do not outweigh actual threats and the good that can come from designation.  Agencies should work together to make sure that designation is the best policy choice for any given group.  The choice to list 
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a group as a foreign terrorist organization will affect all future actions with the group’s members, and potentially with the state in which the group operates.  Research must support the designation as a step in the counterterror policy against the group, rather than the choice of designation being the result of political concerns outside of counterterrorism.     Umberto Eco said, “The list doesn’t destroy culture; it creates it.”  That insight applies even to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list, the primary focus of this work.  Designating certain security threats as “terrorists” shapes understanding about the state’s foreign policy actions.  Focus on the list means that when violent events occur, the public asks about whether the perpetrators were listed almost immediately.  The FTO list is the first step in the legal backing on the War on Terror.  Placement on a terrorist watch list is the legal justification for targeting certain people and groups for counterterror actions.  Designation creates that legal space that allows the state to push for increased surveillance through the FISA court, to hold people indefinitely in Guantanamo Bay, and to target foreign nationals through drone strikes. The FTO list defines who the terrorists are that the state is fighting against, and it is subject to political maneuvering as much as any other piece of policy.     The political process surrounding designation allows state and individual interests to come to bear.  These interests can ultimately lead to deciding to list a group even when its listed status may preclude some helpful actions.  Alternatively, interest politics could slow down a needed designation.  The FTO list forces political 
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actors to account for the designation of groups.  As long as counterterrorism remains a central focus of security policy in the United States, the FTO list will continue to impact the political process by creating a distinct set of individuals, groups, and actions that exist within a political space defined by their relation to the list.  A number of diplomatic actions are precluded once a formal designation has been enacted.  Actions of members of the FTO group and counteractions by state actors will be viewed through the lens of counterterror policy.   The FTO list shapes understanding of how the state is able to interact with violent nonstate actors. By creating a culture in which “terrorist” is a formal designation, the FTO list reinforces the idea that the state is correct in acting against evildoers because the state claims to know exactly who those evildoers are.  That political interests affect listing decisions complicates this idea.  If politicians can focus their discourse on certain topics and lobby for the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups from the list, then we cannot consider that the FTO designation represents an objective accounting of the actions and intentions of nonstate groups.    The interest in listing affects how the culture surrounding the War on Terror is created and disseminated.  Violent groups are subject to media interest that is defined in part by the group’s status as listed, or should be listed, or not.  Coverage of the groups takes state interests into account as certain actions are defined in relation to the status of the group on the terrorist watch lists.  The biases and interests of the state play a role in shaping the messages surrounding group actions and counterterror practices even in countries with media free from state control.  Terrorist attacks are newsworthy events, but the broader messages about 
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counterterror conveyed to the public show that news is framed through political interests.  Those interests can enhance the sense that counterterror policy has a primary place in foreign policy that requires deference in the face of questions about legality and efficacy.    The definitional understanding of terrorism that is the backing for the War on Terror comes from a very malleable section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  The Foreign Terrorist Organization list has far-reaching consequences for those that are tied to listed groups.  Moreover, the list has continuing ramifications for the conception of counterterror as discussed by elites and the media.  Designation is a process that shapes our understanding of who is a terrorist and what appropriate actions against such persons are.  Violent nonstate groups may be treated differently depending on their relationship to state interests.  The differences in treatment and language point to designation as a political process in its own right.   
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APPENDIX    Table A.1.1: Alternative Logistic Regression Results for 12 States   USA Russia UK Canada India Australia New 
Zealand 












0.070 (0.507) -1.56 (1.50) -1.36 (0.326)*** -0.769 (0.652) 0.401 (0.248)** -0.769 (1.45) -0.785 (1.00) -1.00 (1.23) -0.774 (0.948) 1.56 (1.30) -1.07 (0.901) -0.179 (0.331) 
Eigen 
Centrality 
-28.6 (8.83)*** -12.2 (16.5) 9.11 (8.56) -11.5 (9.04) -2.68 (7.81) -0.429 (15.3) -10.7 (7.02) 50.9 (38.8) -6.00 (19.6) 3.70 (15.3) -25.2 (13.0)* -6.32 (9.73) 
Exports (log) -0.129 (0.147) -0.074 (0.296) 0.085 (0.155) -0.200 (0.151) -0.483 (0.202)** 0.075 (0.146) -0.196 (0.096)** 0.496 (0.554) -0.098 (0.484) 0.048 (0.219) 0.515 (0.167)*** -0.213 (0.162) 
Islamic State -0.451 (0.572) 1.92 (1.34) 0.764 (0.560) 0.454 (0.620) 0.029 (0.563) 1.77 (1.13) -0.179 (0.500) 0.000 (0.00) 2.22 (1.32)* 0.082 (1.13) -0.798 (1.05) -0.961 (0.729) 
Constant 3.04 (4.59) 10.2 (12.8) 7.04 (3.24) 6.92 (5.92) 0.089 (2.86) 1.02 (13.7) 9.36 (9.41) -8.45 (14.3) 2.68 (10.3) -17.8 (12.5) 8.36 (7.97) 1.82 (3.64) 
N 172 167 174 173 146 175 175 87 138 174 168 184 Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01 
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      Table A.1.2: Alternative Logistic Regression Results for 12 Countries 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01      
 USA Russia UK Canada India Australia New 
Zealand 












0.136 (0.544) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -1.11 (0.929) 
Closeness -28.7 (9.06)*** -16.7 (11.7) 0.668 (6.19) -6.54 (6.51) 2.70 (5.72) -1.65 (10.1) -1.72 (5.26) -4.17 (17.2) -2.95 (12.9) -1.43 (10.9) -10.5 (8.84) -6.48 (8.09) 
Exports 
(log) 
-0.821 (0.316)*** -0.282 (0.363) 0.462 (0.196)** -0.229 (0.231) -0.290 (0.233) -0.058 (0.232) -0.052 (0.142) 0.578 (0.702) 0.431 (0.503) -0.191 (0.284) 0.333 (0.180)* 0.129 (0.250) 
Islamic 
State 
-0.208 (0.857) 1.16 (1.21) 1.82 (0.766)** 0.438 (0.716) 0.037 (0.567) 1.84 (1.20) 0.687 (0.563) 0.000 (0.00) 3.27 (2.11) -1.29 (1.17) -1.21 (1.34) -1.00 (0.877) 
Constant 23.1 (7.19)*** 9.42 (8.63) -6.13 (4.63) 3.32 (4.72) -0.905 (3.86) -3.51 (7.25) 0.202 (3.69) -5.02 (11.9) -4.50 (9.09) 0.066 (7.05) 4.21 (5.79) 1.00 (5.37) 
N 149 143 149 150 123 152 152 143 115 151 149 155 
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    Table A.1.3: Alternative Logistic Regression Results for 12 States  USA Russia UK Canada India Australia New 
Zealand 












-0.336 (0.440) 0.000 (0.00) -0.835 (0.868) 0.000 (0.00) 0.063 (0.713) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.769 (0.863) 
Closeness -18.4 (6.02)*** -15.6 (9.81) -2.44 (4.99) -7.50 (5.93) 1.69 (5.30) -11.3 (8.66) -5.09 (4.70) -11.9 (13.7) -13.6 (10.3) 0.080 (11.0) -16.7 (8.19)** -2.62 (7.23) 
Exports 
(log) 
-0.119 (0.130) -0.132 (0.173) 0.151 (0.121) -0.288 (0.138)** -0.563 (0.209)*** -0.075 (0.110) -0.189 (0.080)** 0.309 (0.397) 0.264 (0.248) 0.032 (0.200) 0.495 (0.140)*** -0.020 (0.132) 
constant 11.3 (3.91)*** 8.88 (6.59) -0.319 (3.13) 4.61 (3.84) 1.92 (3.48) 4.64 (5.68) 3.80 (3.10) 1.75 (9.54) 5.21 (6.73) -3.79 (6.90) 7.03 (5.29) -1.29 (4.35) 
N 172 166 174 173 146 175 175 166 138 174 168 184 Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01 
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Figure A.1.1: Marginal Effects of Level of Violence, by Time Period 
   Figure A.1.2: Marginal Effects of Economic Ties, by Time Period 
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 Figure A.1.3: Marginal Effects of Regime Type, by Time Period 
    Figures A.1.4: Marginal Effects of International Organization Ties, by Time Period 














































 Table A.2.1: Topics 6 – 10 by Group 
Democrats Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 state year work peopl- time govern- countri- issue nation depart- 
 
secur- nation depart- terror- inform- issu- work committ- threat new 
 
need nation terrorist depart- act provid- adminstr- way attack feder- 
 
state time need peopl- new secur- nation issu- threat system 
 
think secur- state first terror- respon- list adminstr- public back  
 
Republicans Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 state depart- law terrorist threat program respon- govern- work report 
 
terrorist hear secur- senat- program use inform- report- govern- know 
 
terrorist time secur- state terror- attack threat report- intellig- work 
 
state terrorist attack govern- inform- terror- agenc- threat oper- depart- 
 
secur- think need time committ- attack senat- question govern- new  
 
Bureaucrats Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 program state develop- countri- terror- financ- secur- threat system terrorist 
 
state provid- work system terror- terrorist plan feder- threat secur- 
 
state secur- work financ- govern- includ- use terrorist system provide 
 
state depart- program secur- nation terrorist threat unit inform- think 
 
provid- terrorist use system countri- nation terror- unit oper- state 
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Lobbyists Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 provid- secur- inform- state act govern- time public feder- system 
 
need industri- state nation protect time technolog- peopl- terror- use 
 
insur- need state public year terrorist risk work terror- unit 
 
industri- public work terror- busi- inform- respon- act mani- import- 
 
need secur- state govern- american year organ risk  work health   
 
Military Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 forc- state oper- guard command armi- year time depart- team 
 
forc- nation oper- train equip- plan secur- think year provid- 
 
train nation comman- unit work state oper- effort forc- think 
 
train unit secur- forc- provid- support nation state use terror- 
 
work command unit militari- state support mission need  govern- provid-  
 
Experts Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8 Topic 9 Topic 10 nation year peopl- unit health terror- respon- use includ- terrorist 
 
state terrorist secur- think use need provid- work unit law 
 
health terror- state think local know member act countri- group 
 
terrorist nation secur- work peopl- part think state program issu- 
 
state peopl- first health commun- nation year provid- terror- attack 
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Table A.2.2: “Terrorist” correlations by group 
Democrats  Republicans  Bureaucrats  Lobbyists  Military  Experts  terror- 0.55 terror- 0.73 financ- 0.71 financ- 0.67 terror- 0.79 attempt 0.66 attack 0.46 attack 0.62 design 0.63 diminish 0.55 hope 0.78 individu- 0.62 hear 0.46 organ 0.61 law 0.59 investig 0.54 unilater- 0.78 explos- 0.59 includ- 0.46 group 0.57 intern- 0.58 case 0.52 better 0.77 fugit- 0.58 activ- 0.45 intern- 0.57 money 0.58 hezbollah 0.52 mexico 0.76 arm 0.56 case 0.45 enforc- 0.55 organ 0.57 term 0.52 border 0.75 citizen 0.56 organ 0.45 activ- 0.54 disrupt- 0.54 bokoharam 0.51 canada 0.75 coalit- 0.55 clear 0.43 import- 0.54 enforc- 0.54 compliance 0.51 depart- 0.75 attack 0.54 fbi 0.43 use 0.54 group 0.54 hindranc- 0.51 scrutin- 0.75 background 0.54 financ- 0.43 depart- 0.53 foreign 0.53 lebanes- 0.51 press 0.74 gun 0.54  Table A.2.3: “Secur-“ correlations by group 
Democrats  Republicans  Bureaucrats  Lobbyists  Military  Experts homeland 0.62 homeland 0.59 implement 0.54 vulner- 0.63 fraud 0.94 chain 0.58 protect 0.56 ensur- 0.57 measur- 0.52 facil- 0.59 privat- 0.94 homeland 0.58 transport 0.53 work 0.55 risk 0.51 dhs 0.56 tamper 0.94 guard 0.57 warehous 0.53 number 0.53 enhanc- 0.51 homeland 0.54 trade 0.94 sector 0.57 committee 0.50 protect 0.52 inspect 0.50 implement 0.54 bioterror 0.93 transport 0.56 critic- 0.50 member 0.51 requir- 0.50 chemic- 0.53 clearanc- 0.93 enhanc- 0.55 nation 0.50 conduct 0.50 transport 0.49 assess 0.51 consolid- 0.93 identifi- 0.55 depart- 0.48 requir- 0.50 homeland 0.48 perimet- 0.51 dilemma 0.93 implement 0.55 member 0.48 nation 0.49 stakehold- 0.47 buffer 0.50 economi- 0.93 contain- 0.54 associ- 0.47 dhs 0.48 base 0.45 hazard 0.50 enforc- 0.93 requir- 0.54 
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 Table A.2.4: “Intellig-“ correlations by group 
   
Democrats  Republicans  Bureaucrats  Lobbyists  Military  Experts cia 0.69 collect 0.61 counterintellig- 0.74 spi 0.88 millennium 0.74 domest- 0.49 director 0.61 cia 0.57 collector 0.71 antideath 0.87 fashion 0.73 spi- 0.49 analyst 0.54 share 0.57 analyst 0.66 antimilitar- 0.87 gdp 0.73 gather 0.46 declassifi- 0.54 inform- 0.55 combatant 0.66 circumstances 0.87 generat- 0.73 cia 0.45 saddam 0.47 counterintellig- 0.54 outlast 0.66 dossier 0.87 incomplete- 0.73 espionag- 0.45 recant 0.46 foreign 0.51 stagnant 0.66 eavesdrop 0.87 reactionari- 0.73 secret 0.45 tugofwar 0.46 espionag- 0.50 cia 0.59 illegal 0.87 steer 0.73 oper- 0.44 vengeanc- 0.46 confess 0.49 director 0.56 lawfully 0.87 taiwan 0.73 collect- 0.43 congress 0.45 success 0.49 headquart 0.55 militia 0.87 washington 0.72 counterterror 0.43 geospati- 0.45 fbi 0.47 reorient- 0.51 oversight 0.87 enhanc- 0.71 foreign 0.43 
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Table A.2.5: Alternative GLS Specifications  Terror Terror Terror Terror Terror 
Party Affiliation 2.90*** (0.705) 0.994 (0.947) 3.50*** (0.808) 3.52*** (0.808) 2.84*** (0.823) 
Legislative Body 3.40*** (0.739) 3.81*** (0.734) 3.73*** (0.736) 3.72*** (0.736) 3.58*** (0.734) 
Sex 0.515 (0.981) 0.494 (0.982) 0.527 (0.984) 0.517 (0.984) 0.490 (0.980) 
Administration -2.70*** (0.713)     
In House Majority Party  2.94*** (0.937)    
Matches President’s Party   -1.05 (0.792) -1.09 (0.792) 2.48** (1.18) 
Divided Government    0.916 (0.697) -1.94** (0.990) 
Interaction (Party Match * 
Divided Government) 
    -5.74*** (1.42) 
Federal Spending 9.82** (4.37) 7.93* (4.36) 8.60*** (1.12) 7.95* (4.40) 7.15 (4.38) 
Constant 9.58*** (1.86) 3.44*** (1.11) 4.13*** (1.12) 3.84*** (1.14) 5.41*** (4.38) 
N 1937 1937 1937 1937 1937 *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  Table A.2.6: Alternative Logistic Specifications  Terror Terror Terror Terror Terror 
Party Affiliation -0.044 (0.543) -0.062 (0.197) 0.136 (0.181) 0.136 (0.182) 0.133 (0.183) 
Legislative Body 0.543*** (0.178) 0.580*** (0.180) 0.577*** (0.181) 0.578*** (0.182) 0.577*** (0.182) 
Sex 0.163 (0.222) 0.183 (0.224) 0.177 (0.226) 0.177 (0.227) 0.176 (0.227) 
Administration -0.360*** (0.134)     
In House Majority Party  0.036 (0.165)    
Matches President’s Party   -0.360** (0.149) -0.357** (0.149) -0.337 (0.216) 
Divided Government    -0.106 (0.127) -0.122 (0.257) 
Interaction (Party Match * 
Divided Government) 
    -0.032 (0.257) 
Federal Spending -0.026 (0.973) -0.278 (0.977) -0.254 (0.984) -0.182 (0.990) -0.187 (0.991) 
Constant 1.57*** (0.376) 0.801*** (0.249) 0.907*** (0.253) 0.939*** (0.257) -0.187 (0.991) 
N 1937 1937 1937 1937 1937 *p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01 
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Figure A.3.1: Rebel three-year moving averages 
   Figure A.3.2: Militant three-year moving averages 
















Figure A.3.3: Guerrilla three-year moving averages
    Figure A.3.4: Terrorist three-year moving averages.  
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